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Abstract
This paper develops and estimates a spatial general equilibrium job search model to study
the effects of local and universal (federal) minimum wage policies. In the model, firms post
vacancies in multiple locations. Workers, who are heterogeneous in terms of location and edu-
cation types, engage in random search and can migrate or commute in response to job offers.
I estimate the model by combining multiple databases including the American Community
Survey (ACS) and Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI). The estimated model is used to
analyze how minimum wage policies affect employment, wages, job postings, vacancies, migra-
tion/commuting, and welfare. Empirical results show that minimum wage increases in local
county lead to an exit of low type (education<12 years) workers and an influx of high type
workers (education≥12 years), which generates negative externalities for workers in neighbor-
ing areas. I use the model to simulate the effects of a range of minimum wages. Minimum
wage increases up to $14/hour increase the welfare of high type workers but lower welfare
of low type workers, expanding inequality. Increases in excess of $14/hour decrease welfare
for all workers. I further evaluate two counterfactual policies: restricting labor mobility and
preempting local minimum wage laws. For a certain range of minimum wages, both policies
have negative impacts on the welfare of high type workers, but beneficial effects for low type
workers.
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1 Introduction
Traditional minimum wage studies estimate local labor market employment and wage
effects by comparing a group that experienced the minimum wage change to a similar group
in nearby region that did not experience a change.1 This approach can be problematic
when local minimum wage changes are large, because substantial local minimum wage in-
creases likely induce labor mobility and have spillover effects on neighboring areas.2 A full
accounting of minimum wage effects must take into account workers from all affected areas.3
Furthermore, when faced with higher labor costs, firms may substitute lower productivity
workers with higher productivity ones to keep profitable (Horton, 2017). Therefore, some
workers may benefit from minimum wage increases, while others are adversely affected. This
paper studies the distributional and welfare effects of local and universal (federal) minimum
wage policies taking into account worker heterogeneity, spatial mobility, and minimum wages
of varying magnitudes.
To this end, I develop a spatial general equilibrium model that extends Flinn (2006) to
a spatial search context. The economy consists of two adjacent regions, similar to the cross-
border contiguous county pairs in Dube et al. (2016). Workers are differentiated by their
types and locations.4 They receive job offers from local firms and from firms in a neighboring
county. Workers accept a local offer if its value exceeds the value of unemployment. When
considering offers from neighboring regions, workers require extra compensation to offset
migration/commuting costs. Firms decide in which counties to post vacancies, where the
number of vacancies is determined by a free entry condition. Given the assumption of
random search, heterogeneous workers in all locations are contacted by firms at identical
rates. An individual’s productivity when meeting a firm is determined by his/her type and
an idiosyncratic random matching quality. The bargained wage is determined by a surplus
1There is an ongoing debate concerning the effect of minimum wages on employment. See Card and
Krueger (1994, 2000); Dube et al. (2007, 2010, 2016); Neumark (2001); Neumark et al. (2014a,b); Jardim et
al. (2017).
2Recent studies have documented increased labor mobility induced by minimum wage changes, especially
for low skilled workers (Monras, 2015; McKinnish, 2017).
3As of September 2017, 39 counties and cities have passed new minimum wage laws according to the UC
Berkeley Labor Center. 23 out of 39 cities/counties have passed minimum wages of $15 or more, while the
current federal minimum wage remains at $7.25. See http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/minimum-wage-living-
wage-resources/inventory-of-us-city-and-county-minimum-wage-ordinances/for more details.
4Ideally, type could be a summary statistic to rank workers expected productivity. I empirically use
educational attainment as a proxy for worker types. Low type represents high school dropouts while high
type represents high school graduates or more. According to 2015 the Current Population Survey (CPS),
5.8 percent workers are paid an hourly rate at or below federal minimum wage for the low type group, while
this rate drops to 2.9 percent for the high type group.
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division rule, subject to the minimum wage constraint, which left-truncates the original wage
distribution (Flinn, 2006). The new wage structure is a continuous distribution with a mass
point at the minimum wage level.
I estimate this spatial job search model using a Simulated Method of Moments estimator
that combines county-level data moments from various sources. The migration and commut-
ing flows are obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS). Local labor market
conditions (hiring rates, separation rates and employment rates) are obtained from Quarterly
Workforce Indicators (QWI) survey. The payroll share of firms’ expenditures, and the ratio
of job postings to workers come from the Economics Wide Key Statistics (EWKS) and the
Conference Board Help Wanted Online (HWOL).
This model provides a framework to access the effects of minimum wage increases of
a range of magnitude. Previous studies have focused on the most disadvantaged workers,
without considering the welfare consequences for high type workers. To study the impacts of
minimum wage increases for heterogeneous workers, my model incorporates four important
effects. First, conditional on being employed, workers receive a higher wage from the same
matches (the “wage enhancement effect”). Second, a minimum wage increase also causes a
disemployment effect, because it dissolves marginally acceptable matches (the “disemploy-
ment effect”). Low type workers are more likely to be the marginally hired worker. Third,
when firms are mandatory to pay workers more, they receive a smaller fraction of the sur-
plus from same matches (the “share reduction effect”). Fourth, the probability of filling the
vacancy with a high productivity worker increases in the higher minimum wage county but
decreases in its neighboring county (the “worker relocation effect”). The incentive for firms
to post vacancies is reduced in both counties, but especially in the county that does not
change its minimum wage, due to negative spillover effects.
My analysis yields three main results. First, local minimum wage hikes have contrasting
impacts on differentiated workers, expanding the inequality between low type and high type
workers. Low type workers are adversely affected by higher minimum wages, primarily due to
greater disemployment effect. For high type workers, the wage enhancement effect dominates
the disemployment effect when the minimum wage level is less than $14, above which the
countervailing disemployment effect start to dominate. Therefore, the welfare of high type
workers displays a hump shape with a peak at $14/hour. When simulating the welfare
difference of a range of minimum wages, the inequality between high and low type workers
grows as the local minimum wage increases and reaches its peak at $15.
Second, I use the estimated model to evaluate two policies: restricting labor mobility and
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preempting local minimum wage laws.5 For a range of minimum wage values, I find that
the welfare of high type workers is negatively impacted, but both policies have beneficial
effects for low type workers. In the experiment of restricting spatial labor mobility, the
low type workers in neighboring counties prefer two labor markets to be isolated when local
minimum wage increases are large (above $10), because the cost of lost working opportunities
is fully compensated by the benefit of eliminating spillover externalities. In the experiment of
preempting local minimum wage laws, I compare local minimum wage changes with universal
minimum wage changes. I find that low type workers prefer universal minimum wage hikes
over local minimum wage hikes when the minimum wage change is moderate (below $14.5).
The benefit of reducing spillover externalities outweighs the cost of a larger disemployment
effect.
Third, I find the disemployment effect of a minimum wage increase is underestimated
if one ignores labor mobility. On one hand, low educated workers tend to move away in
response to a minimum wage increase and thus “disappear” from the “treated” county. On
the other hand, they “reappear” in the neighboring area, contaminating the control group.
I obtain with the model an estimate of the elasticity of employment with respect to the
minimum wage equal to -0.073; ignoring labor mobility cuts this value in half to -0.034. The
bias is most severe for counties with higher fractions of mobile workers.
My paper contributes to four broad strands of the literature. First, it is the first paper
highlighting the negative spillover effects created by local minimum wage policies. There are
a few recent papers documenting worker migration/commuting decisions are responsive to
local minimum wage changes (Monras, 2015; McKinnish, 2017). However, this is the first
paper linking labor flows with negative externalities for neighboring area workers. The insight
that local policies may create externalities in the neighboring area through policy-induced
migration is also discussed in the fiscal-federalism literature. For example, Serrato and Zidar
(2016) studies the incidence of state corporate taxes on the welfare of workers, landowners
and firm owners. In their model, a state tax cut reduces the tax liability and the cost of
capital, attracting more establishments to move in. Cohen et al. (2011) studies the effects
of marginal tax rates on migration decisions in the U.S., while Young and Varner (2011)
and Moretti and Wilson (2017) focus on the geographic locations of top earners. Although
policy-induced migration has already drawn significant attentions in the tax competition
literature, my paper is the first application in the minimum wage context.
5The minimum wage preemption laws prohibit cities from enacting their own minimum wage laws. As
of July 6, 2017, 25 states have passed such laws. See http://www.nelp.org/publication/fighting-preemption-
local-minimum-wage-laws/ for a more comprehensive policy review.
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My paper also contributes to the structural minimum wage literature. It extends Flinn
(2006) by allowing for location-specific minimum wages and spatial mobility. Previous mini-
mum wage studies usually assume one universal minimum wage for the whole labor market.
(Eckstein and Wolpin, 1990; Van den Berg and Ridder, 1998; Flinn, 2006; Mabli and Flinn,
2007; Eckstein et al., 2011; Flinn and Mullins, 2015; Flinn et al., 2017) By extending the
framework to multiple connected sub-markets, my model is able to incorporate geographical
minimum wage variation for identification and evaluate the externalities of local minimum
wage laws. The spatial search framework in my paper is similar to that of Meghir et al.
(2015), which develops an equilibrium wage-posting model with formal and informal sec-
tors. Their paper focuses on firm heterogeneity while I focus on worker heterogeneity. Other
relevant spatial equilibrium frameworks include Coen-Pirani (2010); Baum-Snow and Pa-
van (2012); Kennan and Walker (2011); Schmutz and Sidibe (2016). By embedding local
minimum wage policy into a spatial equilibrium model, my model allows examination of
the effects of minimum wages on labor mobility, local employment, migration, wages and
welfare.
This paper also explores the methodological implications for minimum wage studies that
use adjacent counties as the control group. Starting with Card and Krueger (1994), cross-
border comparisons became a popular method of studying the employment effects of mini-
mum wage increases. For example, Dube et al. (2007, 2010, 2016) generalize this strategy to
all contiguous county pairs and find small disemployment effects, consistent with Card and
Krueger (1994). Although the cross-border design is persuasive, because of the geographic
proximity between the treatment and control areas, there are concerns about the assump-
tion that adjacent counties are unaffected, particularly when the minimum wage discrepancy
between counties is large. I find that ignoring labor mobility leads to an underestimation
of disemployment effects for two reasons. First, the unemployed workers move out of the
“treated” area when they can not find jobs, and second, they move into neighboring areas,
contaminating the control group.
Lastly, this paper contributes to the recent local labor market policy literature, emphasiz-
ing the potential externalities caused by place-based policies.6 I show that low type workers,
who are the intended beneficiaries of minimum wage policies, are actually worse-off after
minimum wage increases. The estimates of moving cost confirms that taking the neighbor-
ing job is costly in general, which is consistent with the finding in Manning and Petrongolo
(2017). While their paper argues that the probability of a random distant (at least 5km
6See Glaeser et al. (2008) and Enrico (2011) for reviews. Other recent papers include Kline (2010); Busso
et al. (2013); Kline and Moretti (2013)
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away) job being preferred to random local (less than 5km away) job is only 19% based on
data from UK. Using county-level U.S. data, I find a slightly higher probability of 22.2%.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents a spatial job search
equilibrium model. Section 3 describes the multiple data sources I will use to estimate the
model. Section 4 discusses the identification and estimation strategy. Section 5 present the
estimation results. Section 6 discusses the counterfactual experiments. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
I develop a dynamic spatial search model where individuals live and work in one of
the paired counties (j, j′). A job seeker in one county may receive either a local offer or a
neighboring offer at certain rates. When a worker meets a firm in county j, they bargain over
the wage subject to the minimum wage policy in county j. Local minimum wage changes
would potentially affect labor market conditions in the neighboring county due to labor
mobility.
2.1 Framework
I consider a continuous time model, where infinitely lived, risk neutral workers maximize
their expected utility (income) with discount rate ρ. The economy consists of two adjacent
local markets, a pair of counties (j, j′). The economy has a fixed number of potential workers
with different types a. N(a, j) represents the number of workers with type a in county j.
Type is discrete, taking n different values a ∈ A = {a1, ..., an}.7 The number of workers
for each type is exogenous. However, their working and living status are determined by
the endogenous job searching process. U(a, j), L(a, j), and (a, j) represent the number of
unemployed workers, local workers, and mobile workers with type a in county j. I focus on
job search and labor mobility behavior in the steady state.
2.2 Worker’s problem with wage w
A job seeker of type a in county j may receive wage offers from county j or j′. Upon
meeting a firm, the productivity is given by
y = aθ
7For computational tractability, I consider two types: high (ah) and low (al) in the empirical analysis.
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where θ is the random matching quality, which is assumed to be an i.i.d. draw from the
distribution function G(θ).8 I first consider the decisions for an unemployed worker with
ability a in location j. At the beginning of each period, the worker experiences a set of
location preference shocks {ϑuj(a, j), ϑuj′(a, j)}. The worker then chooses to become either
a stayer to search jobs in the local labor market or a mover to search jobs the neighboring
market. I use notation d(a, j, ϑ) to summary the dummy location choice, which has the
following expression:
d(a, j, ϑ) =
 0(stayer) if vuj(a, j) + ϑuj(a, j) > vuj′(a, j) + ϑuj′(a, j)1(mover) if vuj(a, j) + ϑuj(a, j) ≤ vuj′(a, j) + ϑuj′(a, j)
an unemployed worker faces individual-specific preference shocks for locations they search
for jobs. I use notation Vu(a, j) to represent the ex-ante unemployed value before the pref-
erence shock realized. After the location preference shocks ϑuj(a, j) and ϑuj′(a, j) realized,
the unemployed workers always choose whichever labor market generating a higher value,
which is captured by the following equation:
Vu(a, j) = Eνujνuj′ max
{
vuj(a, j) + ϑuj(a, j), vuj′(a, j) + ϑuj′(a, j)
}
where vuj(a, j) is the systematic component of the ex-post unemployed values when workers
decide to search job in local county j. And vuj′(a, j) is the systematic component when
searching jobs in neighboring county j′. Assuming the preference shock {ϑuj(a, j), ϑuj′(a, j)}
follow i.i.d. type I extreme value distributions with a location parameter 0 and a common
scale parameter σua , then the choice probability of each location is specified as:
Pj(a, j) =
exp(vuj(a, j)/σ
u
a)
exp(vuj(a, j)/σua) + exp(vuj′(a, j)/σ
u
a)
, Pj′(a, j) =
exp(vuj′(a, j)/σ
u
a)
exp(vuj(a, j)/σua) + exp(vuj′(a, j)/σ
u
a)
I will now specify the constant part of the unemployed value under these two searching
states:
8The assumption that the flow productivity yij = aiθj is the multiplicity of a firm type θj and a worker
type ai is standard in the literature (Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002); Cahuc et al. (2006)). Following this
spirit, the distribution of matching productivity should be location-specific (firm-specific) Gj(θ). Since labor
market conditions in county pairs should be similar, I assume the matching productivity Gj(θ) is the same
for these two counties.
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ρvuj(a, j) = abj︸︷︷︸
(1) flow value
+λj
∫ ∞
mj
{Ve(w, j)− Vu(a, j)}+dF (w|a, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2) option value of accepting a local offer
ρvuj′(a, j) = abj︸︷︷︸
(1) flow value
+λj′
∫ ∞
mj′
{Ve(w, j′)− c(a, j)− Vu(a, j)}+dF (w|a, j′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3) option value of accepting a neighbouring offer
The notation {x}+ ≡ max{x, 0}. abj represents the flow utility of staying unemployed for
workers with ability a and in location j.λj is the job arrival rate in the local market and λj′
is the job arrival rate in the neighboring market. mj and mj′ represent the minimum wage
level in county j and county j′, respectively. Conditioning on location j and ability a, the
agent draw a match-specific quality θ and bargaining wage w with firms. I will specify the
bargaining process in the next session. The optimal job acceptance decision is maximizing
between staying unemployed Vu(a, j) and accepting the new employment status.
While the option values between local market and neighboring market have a very similar
structure, the key distinguishable term is the moving cost c(a, j) when accepting the neigh-
boring offer, following similar assumption in Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012) and Schmutz
and Sidibe (2016). If c(a, j) = 0, the workers in county j and county j′ will have exactly the
same working opportunities, which means paired counties are essentially one united labor
market. If c(a, j) = +∞, the paired counties are totally isolated markets. As pointed out by
Schwartz (1973) and Greenwood (1975), this moving cost summarizes both the psychic cost
of losing local social connections with family and friends and the physical transportation
cost, which depends on the moving distance. The specifically parametric form of the moving
cost will be shown in section 4.1.
I assume no on-the-job search. Therefore, the worker who accepts a job with wage w
will never voluntarily quit the current job. Thus the existing matches only dissolve with a
constant exogenous rate ηj. The value of employment, V
e
t , has the the following form
9:
(1) Ve(w, a, j) =
w + ηjVu(a, j)
ρ+ ηj
2.3 Bargaining with a minimum wage constraint
In this section, I specify how the wage between the worker and the firm is determined.
I first consider the case without a minimum wage. If a worker with type a meets a firm in
9The derivations of equations ?? and 1 are described in Appendix A.1.
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location j and draws a matching quality θ in period t, the bargained wage is assumed to
be derived from a Nash bargaining solution. The wage wˆ(a, j, θ) maximizes the weighted
product of the worker’s and firm’s net return from the match. To form the match, the worker
gives up the value of unemployment Vu(a, j), and the firm gives up the unfilled homogeneous
vacancy, which has zero value according to the free entry condition.10
wˆ(a, j, θ) = arg max
w
(Ve(w, a, j)− Vu(a, j))αj Vf (w, a, θ, j)1−αj
where location specific bargaining weight αj is strictly between 0 and 1, representing the
relative bargaining strength of the labor side. Vf is the present value of the filled vacancy
for the firm. As derived in Appendix A.2, the bargained wage offer function is:
(2) wˆ(a, j, θ) = ρVu(a, j) + αj(aθ − ρVu(a, j))
The interpretation of this bargained wage is intuitive. The workers receive their reservation
wage ρVu(a, j) and a fraction of bargained share αj of the net surplus of the current match,
which is the total production aθ minus what workers give up ρVu(a, j).
Following Flinn (2006), the introduction of a minimum wage in area j is treated as a
“side constraint” to the original bargaining problem.
w(a, j, θ) = arg max
w≥mj
(Ve(w, a, j)− Vu(a, j))αj Vf (w, a, θ, j)1−αj
The minimum wage constraint w ≥ mj is imposed by local policy maker and applies to all
potential job matches. Before considering the case when the minimum wage binds, I solve
for the critical value of matching quality where the worker receives exactly the minimum
wage based on the original surplus decision rule (Equation 2).
θˆ(a, j) =
mj − (1− αj)ρVu(a, j)
aαj
If θˆ(a, j) ≤ mj
a
, the minimum wage has no effect on the bargained wage because the reserva-
tion value is so high that all acceptable matches for workers actually give them wages equal
or larger than mj. (i.e. aθ
∗(a, j) ≥ mj). If θˆ(a, j) > mja , the minimum wage is binding
when θ ∈ [mj
a
, θˆ). The firms in this scenario would pay workers mj, which is more than the
10I do not model different outside options for local workers and mobile workers for two reasons. First, it
is unclear whether moving costs are a credible “threat point” for mobile workers because they have to pay
the moving cost before they can work in the other county. Second, due to menu costs, it is not economic for
firms to make a separate wage offers for mobile workers who are a minority of new hires.
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worker’s “implicit” reservation wage wˆ(a, j, θ). Although payroll expenditure expands, it is
still in firms’ best interests to hire these workers, because destroying the jobs would reduce
profits to zero. The binding minimum wage creates a wedge between the worker’s wage and
their “implicit” reservation wage, making the latter unobservable. Following Flinn (2006), I
introduce the reservation matching quality θ∗(a, j), which is the lowest matching quality of
a local match that a worker with type a will accept. In other words, the worker is indifferent
between accepting a local job with matching quality θ∗(a, j) and staying unemployed.
V e(wˆ(a, j, θ∗(a, j)), a, j) = V u(a, j)
θ∗(a, j) =
ρVu(a, j)
a
This reservation matching quality would be “implicit” in the case when the minimum wage
binds (mj > ρVu(a, j)).In this way, I obtain an affine mapping between the cumulative
distribution of the matching quality, G(θ), and the cumulative wage distribution F (w|a, j):
(3) ft(w|a, j) =

(aα)−1g(θ˜(w,a,j))
G˜(
mj
a
)
G˜(θˆ(a,j))−G˜(mj
a
)
G˜(
mj
a
)
0
w > mj
w = mj
w < mj
where f(w|a, j) is the probability distribution function(PDF) of F (w|a, j), g(θ) is the PDF
of G(θ), and G˜(θ) = 1−G(θ) is the complementary function of the cumulative distribution
function G(θ). θ˜(w, a, j) =
w−(1−αj)ρVu(a,j)
aαj
denotes the matching quality whose bargained
wage is equal to w. The observed wage distribution consists of a point mj with mass
G(θˆ(a,j))−G˜(mj
a
)
G˜(
mj
a
)
and a continuous function (assuming G(θ) is continuous) when θ > θˆ. Thus
the bargained wage can be summarized as:
(4) w(a, j,θ) = max{mj, αjaθ + (1− αj)ρVu(a, j)}
It is worth to point out that a binding minimum wage affects the wages of all workers,
but through different channels. For the workers with matching quality θ ∈ [mj
a
, θˆ(a, j)), the
minimum wage directly benefits them by boosting their wage to mj. For workers with even
higher matching quality θ ∈ [θˆ(a, j),∞), the minimum wage changes their value of unem-
ployment ρVu(a, j).
11 To summarize, introducing the minimum wage as a side restriction
11However, the sign of this change is ambiguous, depending on the trade-off between the increase of
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on Nash-bargained wages converts a continuous underlying productivity distribution into a
mixed continuous-discrete accepted wage distribution, with a mass point at the minimum
wage.
2.4 Migration/commuting trade-off
Next, I characterize the spatial strategies of the workers. To capture the different types
of labor mobility observed in the data, I distinguish commuting from migrating by specifying
a choice-specific moving cost cch(a, j), h = {0, 1}. The timing is as follows: (1) an offer from
neighboring area j′ arrives at rate λj′ . (2) After the matching quality θ is realized, the worker
decides to accept/reject the offer based on the trade-off between the wage offer w(a, j′, θ)
net of the ex-ante moving cost c(a, j) and the value of unemployment, Vu(a, j). (3) If the
worker accepts the offer, the preference shock εh is realized and the worker chooses whether
to commute or migrate.
A worker with type a continues to receive job offers from the neighboring county at rate
λj′ . The expected moving cost c(a, j), is a function of the worker’s type and location-specific
characteristics. Following Schmutz and Sidibe (2016), I introduce a “implicit” mobility
compatible indifferent matching quality θ∗∗(a, j), fulfilling the following condition:
Vu(a, j) + c(a, j) = Ve(θ
∗∗(a, j), a, j′)
where j represents the worker’s place of residence and thus j′ will be the worker’s place of
work. The worker will accept the neighboring offer if and only if the matching quality of
the offer exceeds the mobility compatible threshold θ ≥ θ∗∗(a, j). This match will also be
sustainable for firms as long as θ ≥ mj′
a
. To summarize, the worker whose residence is in
county j will accept a neighboring offer if and only if θ ≥ max{mj‘
a
, θ∗∗(a, j)}.
After accepting the neighboring offer, workers have two alternatives. They can either
work as migrants (h = 1), pay a lump-sum cost cch=1(a, j), and become a native worker in
county j′ or work as commuters (h = 0) and pay a recurring commuting cost cch=0(a, j).
I use cch(a, j) to represent the lump-sum equivalent cost. The choice-specific moving cost
cch(a, j) is a function of both the worker’s type and physical distance between counties, as
well as the cost differences of house renting between paired counties. Its exact parametric
form will be discussed in Section 4.1.
In additional to the moving cost cch(a, j), workers also receive an unobserved preference
expected income and the reduction of expected working opportunities.
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shock εah. The workers thus choose their lowest cost mobility option, h(a, j):
h(a, j) =
 01
if εah − cc0(a, j) > εah − cc1(a, j)
if εah − cc0(a, j) ≤ εah − cc1(a, j)
Assuming the preference shock εah follows an i.i.d. type I extreme value distribution with a
location parameter 0 and a common scale parameter σca, then the ex-ante expected cost has
the following analytic formula (Rust 1987):
c(a, j) = max{εa0 − cc0(a, j), εa1 − cc1(a, j)}
= σca log(
∑1
h=0 exp(−cch(a, j))/σca) + σcaγ
The probability of each choice is specified as:
(5) Qh(a, j) =
exp(−cch(a, j)/σca)
exp(−cc0(a, j)/σca) + exp(−cc1(a, j)/σca)
2.5 Worker’s optimal strategies
The worker’s optimal strategies consists of the search location choices and the sequential
job taking strategies in both locations. The local decision is fully described by the implicit
reservation matching quality θ∗(a, j), while the moving decisions are summarized by both
the implicit mobility compatible matching quality θ∗∗(a, j) and migration/commuting choice
probability Qh(a, j).
Proposition 1. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
For unemployed workers of type a in county j, the optimal strategy is:
 Search in the local labor market with probability Pj(a, j)
– Accept any local job with matching quality θ higher than max{θ∗(a, j), mj
a
}
 Search in the local labor market with probability Pj′(a, j) = 1− Pj(a, j)
– Accept any neighboring job with matching quality θ higher than max{θ∗∗(a, j), mj′
a
}
* Choose to commute with probability Q0(a, j)
* Choose to migrate with probability Q1(a, j)
In the last part of this section, I describe the fixed point equation system that is used to
solve for θ∗(a, j) and θ∗∗(a, j). By applying both the reservation matching quality θ∗(a, j)
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and mobility compatible matching quality θ∗∗(a, j) to Equation ??, I get the following system
of equations:12
(6)
aθ∗(a, j) = abj︸︷︷︸
(1) Flow utility
+
λj
ρ+ηj
[I (θ∗(a, j) <
mj
a
)(mj − aθ∗(a, j))
(
G˜(θˆ(a, j))− G˜(mj
a
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2) Local offer with wage mj
+
∫
max{θˆ(a,j),θ∗(a,j)}
aαj(θ − θ∗(a, j))dG(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3) Local offer with wage wj > mj
]
+
λj′
ρ+ηj′
[I(θ∗∗(a, j) <
mj′
a
)(mj′ − aθ∗(a, j′))
(
G˜(θ∗∗(a, j))− G˜(mj′
a
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4) Neighbouring offer with wage mj′
+
∫
max{θˆ(a,j′),θ∗∗(a,j)}
aαj(θ − θ∗(a, j′))dG(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5) Neighbouring offer with wage wj′ > mj′
+ (ρ+ ηj′) (
a(θ∗(a, j)− θ∗(a, j′))
ρ
+ c(a, j))G˜(θ∗∗(a, j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(6) The unemployed value difference between staying/moving
]
with
θˆ(a, j) =
mj−(1−αj)aθ∗(a,j)
aαj
θˆ(a, j′) =
mj′−(1−αj′ )aθ∗(a,j′)
aαj′
θ∗∗ : Vu(a, j) + c(a, j) = Ve(θ∗∗(a, j), a, j′)
In equation 6, the value of the implicit matching quality aθ∗(a, j) consists of six components:
(1) the instant flow utility ab when unemployed; (2) the expected value associated with a
local offer with binding minimum wage mj; (3) the expected value associated with a local
offer with wage wj > mj; (4) the expected value associated with an acceptable neighboring
offer with binding minimum wage mj′ ; (5) the expected value associated with an acceptable
neighboring offer with wage wj′ > mj′ ; (6) the unemployed utility difference between staying
and moving, which includes both the moving cost c(a, j) and the change of the option value
of being unemployed aθ∗(a, j)− aθ∗(a, j′).
The intuition of equation 6 is straightforward. The value difference between accepting
the lowest acceptable job and remaining unemployed aθ∗(a, j)− abj reflects an opportunity
cost, which is perfectly compensated by the expected premium of finding a better job in the
future. This job could either be a local one or a neighboring one after paying the moving
cost c(a, j).
12The derivation of equation 6 can be found in Appendix A.3
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2.6 Endogenous contact rate
In this section I consider how the contact rates λj, j = 1, 2, are determined in general
equilibrium. I assume that firms randomly encounter workers with the same probability.
This assumption captures the idea that workers applying for the same position may have
different productivity but are easily to substitute with each other. I adapt the Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) framework and allow firms to post vacancies Kj in county j with constant
marginal cost ψj which is open to all workers in both counties. The matching technology is
assumed to be constant returns to scale. Let N =
∑
a∈A(U(a, j) + U(a, j
′)) be the number
of all job seekers in the economy, where U(a, j) is the number of unemployed workers with
type a in county j. If the firms in county j creates Kj vacancies, then the total number of
potential matches created in county j, Mj, is given by
Mj = N
ωjK
1−ωj
j
where ωj is the matching elasticity parameter in market j.
I use a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant return to scale and total factor
productivity equal to 1. It then only requires one parameter ωj to characterize the hetero-
geneity of matching functions in each local labor market j.
The contact rate per job in county j, qj(kj), can be represented as:
qj(kj) = k
ωj
j
where kj =
N
Kj
captures the market tightness. The correlation between market tightness and
job arrival probability λj is
(7) λj = kj(Kj, N)
ωj−1
It is important to emphasize that although workers in both counties have the exact same
opportunities to meet with the same firm, their willingness to accept the same job is different
due to moving costs. For workers living in the neighboring county, they are more picky about
neighboring jobs because the job premium has to compensate for the additional moving cost.
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The total number of matches created by the firms in county j is:
Total Hires =
Mj
N
∑
a∈A
U(a, j)G(max{θ∗(a, j), mja })︸ ︷︷ ︸
Local Hires
+U(a, j′)G
(
max{θ∗∗(a, j′), mj
a
}
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Neighboring Hires

The firm’s value of a match can be represented as:
(8) Vf (θ, a, j) =
aθ − w(a, θ, j)
ρ+ ηj
The expected value of creating a vacancy for firms Vv in county j is:
Vv = −ψj+kj(Kj , N)
ωi
N
∑
a∈A
U(a, j)
∫
max{θ∗(a,j),mja }
Vf (θ, a, j)dG(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from local workers
+U(a, j′)
∫
max{θ∗∗(a,j′),mja }
Vf (θ, a, j)dG(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from neighboring workers

Assuming each county has a population of potential entrants with an outside option equal
to 0, firms will continue to create vacancies until the expected profit is equal to 0, Vv = 0.
Under the free entry condition (FEC), the endogenous contact rate is determinate by the
following equation
(9)
ψj =
kj(Kj , N)
ωi
N
∑
a∈A
[
U(a, j)
∫
max{θ∗(a,j),mja }
Vf (θ, a, j)dG(θ) + U(a, j
′)
∫
max{θ∗∗(a,j′),mja }
Vf (θ, a, j)dG(θ)
]
2.7 Definition of a steady-state spatial equilibrium
Let θ ∈ R+, a ∈ A = {a1, a2, ..., an}, j ∈ J = {1, 2}, and let S1 = R+ ×A× J and
S2 = A× J . Let B(R+) be the Borel σ−algebra of R+ and P (A), P (J) the power sets
of A and J , respectively. Let ℵ = B(R+)×P (A)× P (J), and M be the set of all finite
measures over the measurable space (S1,ℵ)
Definition 1. A steady-state spatial equilibrium is a set of individual functions for workers
Vu : S1 → R+ and Ve, θ∗, θ∗∗, Ph : S2 → R+, a set of the functions for firms Vf : S1 → R+
and {Kj}j=1,2, a set of contact rates {λj}j=1,2 and wage rates w : S1 → R+ and a set of
aggregate measures of different working status U,L,M : S2 → R+, the following conditions
hold:
1. Worker’s problem: given the contact rate, wage and initial condition, Vu and Ve are the
solutions of Eqs. ?? and 1, respectively. The optimal strategies θ∗, θ∗∗ are described in
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Proposition 1 and {Ph}h=0,1 are described in Eq. 5. The functions {Vu, Ve, θ∗, θ∗∗, Ph}
are measurable with respect to ℵ.
2. Firm’s problem: given the contact rate, wage and initial condition, Vf is solved by Eq.
8 and Kj is solved by Eq. 9.
3. The bargained wage: the bargained wage with a minimum wage constraint is defined
by Eqs. 3 and 4.
4. Endogenous contact rate (labor market clear): the contact rate λj is solved by Eq. 7.
5. The aggregate measures of working status keep constant
λj
(
U(a, j)G˜(max{θ∗(a, j), mj
a
}) + U(a, j′)P0(a, j′)G˜(max{θ∗∗(a, j′), mj
a
})
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflow to L
= L(a, j)ηj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outflow from L
U(a, j)
(
λjG˜(max{θ∗(a, j), mj
a
}) + λj′G˜(max{θ∗∗(a, j), mj
′
a
})
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outflow from U
= L(a, j)ηj +M(a, j)ηj′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflow into U
λjU(a, j
′)P1(a, j′)G˜(max{θ∗∗(a, j′), mj
a
}))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflow to M
= M(a, j)ηj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outflow from M
3 Data and descriptive statistics
This paper primarily uses two data sets: the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI)
for local labor market information and the American Community Survey (ACS) for labor
mobility information. QWI provides the number of job stocks and flows, and average earn-
ings by industry, worker demographics, employer age, and size. The QWI comes from the
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) linked employer-employee micro data,
which are collected through a unique federal-state sharing collaboration between the U.S.
Census Bureau and state labor market agencies.13 Compared to the CPS and JOLTS, the
QWI has near-universal worker-employer paired information, covering 96% of all private-
sector jobs. Second, QWI provides worker-side demographic information such as age, sex,
race/ethnicity, and education.14 This feature allows me to analyze the demographics of a
particular industry or specific local market.15 Lastly, QWI has labor flow information, in-
cluding hires, separations, and turnovers, which are important because the direct impacts
13Data for Massachusetts, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands are still under development.
14Workers are identified by their Social Security number and linked with a variety of sources, including the
2000 Census, Social Security Administrative records, and individual tax returns to get their demographic
information.
15While CPS contains similar information based-on household surveys, it generates small sample sizes
when analyzing individual industries or areas.
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of minimum wage hikes are on job turnovers rather than employment stocks.16I focus on
2005-2015 primarily because the states missing from QWI before 2005 are not random -
smaller states are under-represented. By 2005, all states except Massachusetts have joined
the QWI program.17
In addition to QWI data, I also use the ACS from 2005-2015 to identify the commuting
and migration flows between different jurisdictions.18 Commuters are defined as people
whose place of work is different from their place of residence, while migrants are defined as
those who have changed their place of residence in the past year, according to the ACS. The
basic geographic units in the ACS are “Public Use Micro Areas”(PUMAs) which are special
non-overlapping areas that partition each state into contiguous geographic units containing
between 100,000 to 300,000 residents. There were a total of 2,071 PUMAs in the 2000 census.
3.1 Contiguous border county pairs and their associated geographic
minimum wage variations
Following the contiguous county-pair design proposed by Dube et al. (2010, 2016), I divide
all counties in the U.S. into two sub-samples: counties that border another state (border
counties), and counties that do not (interior counties). Out of 3,124 counties, 1,139 counties
are border counties and I construct 1,181 unique pairs.19 Figure 1 shows the locations of all
counties along with their associated minimum wage policies. Between 2005 and 2015, there
were 332 minimum wage adjustments (see 13 for details of minimum wage policies). While
78 changes are driven by the federal minimum wage law, the Fair Minimum Wage Act of
2007,20 the other 164 events were due to state ordinances. Two observations are highlighted
on the map. First, border counties frequently adjust their minimum wages. Between 2005
and 2015, all counties (except for those in Iowa) changed their local minimum wage at least
three times, which gives me adequate variation to identify the effects of minimum wage hikes.
Second, western counties are larger than other counties. Thus, the workers in those counties
may suffer higher moving costs when working in a neighboring county.
In a given year, about half of the county pairs have different minimum wages. These
differences average about 10%, but there is substantial heterogeneity across years (see Table
16See Dube et al. (2010, 2016) for detailed discussions.
17Massachusetts does not join the QWI until 2010.
18I combine the 2005-2007, 2008-2010, and 2011-2015 ACS.
19Counties may border more than one county in the adjacent state, resulting in more pairs than border
counties.
20The Act raised the federal minimum wage in three stages: to $5.85 60 days after enactment (2007-07-24),
to $6.55 one year after that (2008-07-24), then finally to $7.25 one year after that (2009-07-24).
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Figure 1: Frequency of Minimum Wage Adjustments for Border Counties (2005-2015)
Border counties (Obs: 1139)
Times of minimum wage changes during year 05−15
Change 11 or 12 times (3.92%)
Change 9 or 10 times (11.76%)
Change 7 or 8 times (5.88%)
Change 5 or 6 times (31.38%)
Change 3 or 4 times (47.06%)
 
Interior states (Obs: 1971)
1). Overall, the substantial variation between county minimum wages is useful for identifying
the effect of minimum wage hikes.
3.2 Migration and commuting flows
I use the American Community Survey (ACS) Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS)
data between 2005-2015 to distinguish commuters and migrants. Each respondent provides
information about their place of residence one year ago, their current residence, and their
current working address. To perform policy analysis, I convert PUMAs into pseudo-counties
using the Michigan Population Studies Center PUMA-to-County crosswalk.21
To construct a sample of workers most sensitive to minimum wage changes, I restrict
my sample to individuals between 16 and 30 that live in the continental U.S. and are not
currently in the military. I divide this sample into two groups based on education: the low
educated group (high school dropouts group) and the high educated group (the high school
graduates and above). These restrictions are commonly used in the literature because young
people and least-educated people are more likely to be minimum wage workers (Deere et
21I do this for two reasons. First, since PUMAs are population-based, they are not natural jurisdictions
for local policy analysis. In urban areas, a single county may contain multiple PUMAs. For example, Los
Angeles County, California is comprised of 35 PUMAs. Likewise, a PUMA will consist of several counties
in less population areas. Second, I want to match the ACS to county-based statistics from the QWI. See
Appendix C.2 and http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/dis/census/Features/puma2cnty/for details.
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Table 1: Differences in County Pair Minimum Wages (2005-2015)
Year Share of pairs with Percent difference
minimum wages in minimum wages
differential
2005 27.6% 18.6%
2006 33.6% 19.1%
2007 66.0% 15.6%
2008 63.7% 11.1%
2009 52.2% 8.7%
2010 31.8% 5.8%
2011 36.2% 6.0%
2012 37.8% 7.7%
2013 44.1% 7.4%
2014 49.0% 8.6%
2015 68.5% 9.4%
Average 46.4% 10.7%
al. (1995); Burkhauser et al. (2000); Neumark (2001)). If the minimum wage effect is not
significant for this group, then it is unlikely to be significant for other groups.
Local governments prioritize their residents over residents of neighboring counties and
as a result, I carefully distinguish between migrants (who have moved out of a county)
and commuters (who might work in neighboring counties). Descriptive statistics for both
commuting outflows to other states and migration inflows from other states are provided in
Table 2.22 Migrants are defined as individuals whose county of residence last year differs
from their current county of residence. Commuters are defined as workers whose state of
work differs from their state of residence. The rate (a value between 0 and 1) represents the
share of commuters in the labor force. All statistics are on county-level and are grouped
by whether they are border or interior counties. Border counties have higher migration and
commuting rates, likely because commuting and moving costs are lower (See Table 2)
I further estimates some regression models to explore how migration flows and commuting
flows respond to the local minimum wage hikes. The results suggest that low educated
workers tend to move away from rather than move towards counties with minimum wage
increases, either by commuting or migration. In contrast, the high educated workers, who
are served as the control group, are less responsive to the minimum wage changes. And
22The other two potential measures of labor mobility patterns are commuting inflows and migrating
outflows. They are in principle able to be calculated by summarizing all workers who migrate from/commute
into the targeted PUMA in the sample. However, this calculation suffers from serious measurement error
because the migrants from the particular PUMA and the commuters working in the particular PUMA are a
small minority in other PUMAs and thus unlikely to be sampled.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Migrants and Commuters (2005-2015)
Interior counties Border counties Difference
Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate
ALL workers
Migrants Mean 231 0.040 266 0.051 35.0 0.011
S.D. 749 0.038 829 0.047 (8.96) (0.0005)
Commuters Mean 44.9 0.019 210 0.066 165 0.047
S.D. 138 0.078 718 0.127 (6.48) (0.0013)
Low educated group
Migrants Mean 28.5 0.024 31.5 0.030 3.00 0.006
S.D. 95.4 0.033 87.2 0.040 (1.01) (0.0004)
Commuters Mean 4.49 0.021 20.1 0.047 15.6 0.026
S.D. 20.2 0.090 74.7 0.118 (0.681) (0.0012)
High educated group
Migrants Mean 203 0.045 235 0.058 22.0 0.013
S.D. 674 0.043 770 0.053 (8.25) (0.0005)
Commuters Mean 40.4 0.031 189 0.070 149 0.039
S.D. 125 0.097 656 0.130 (5.92) (0.0013)
Observation 22,033 12,518
Data Source: ACS. Note: All statistics are reported at the county level. The count of migrations reports the number of
individuals in each county whose place of residence last year differs from the place this year. The rate (a value between 0 and
1) is the percent of migrants in the local population. The count of commuters is the total number of workers whose state of
work differs from the state of current residence. The rate (a value between 0 and 1) represents the percent of these commuters
among the people who are currently in the labor force. Difference is border minus interior. * for 10%. ** for 5%, and *** for
1%.
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Table 3: County-Level Labor Market Summary Statistics (2005-2015)
Interior counties Border counties
Mean SD Mean SD
Monthly earnings 1932 739 1930 739
Employment 14883 54878 13045 45968
Separation rates 0.299 0.111 0.301 0.103
Hire rates 0.326 0.171 0.326 0.128
Labor force participation rate
All 0.618 0.199 0.623 0.197
High educated 0.701 0.222 0.704 0.219
Low educated 0.394 0.161 0.399 0.162
Note: All statistics are quarterly and from Quarterly Workforce Indicators except labor force partici-
pation, which is from the American Community Survey. Monthly earnings are in nominal dollars.
these mobility patterns are robust to the following sensitivity analysis: (1) use alternative
migration flows based on addresses on the income tax returns provided by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS); (2) using only the minimum wage changes caused by federal minimum
wage laws; (3) restricting to county pairs whose centriods are within 75 kilometers. The
detailed regression results are reported in Table 11 in Appendix B.1.
3.3 Local labor market outcomes
From the QWI, I extract four quarterly variables: average monthly earnings, employ-
ment, hire rates, and separation rates. To make the QWI sample comparable to the ACS
sample, I restrict worker’s age to be between 19-34.23 Labor force participation is extracted
independently from the ACS. Overall, border and interior counties are similar across labor
market statistics (Table 3).
In Appendix B.1, I estimates a regression models following Dube et al. (2007) and Dube
et al. (2016) to examine the magnitude of disemployment in response to minimum wage
increases. When using a common time fixed effect in column (1) in Table 11, the estimated
disemployment elasticity is -0.068. However, this disemployment effect shrinks to -0.039 in
column (2) when I replace the common time fixed effect with a pair-specific time fixed effect
as the control. I attribute this change to the existence of spatial spillover effect. After the
local county increases its own minimum wage, unemployed workers may seek their jobs in the
23The division of age groups in QWI are 19-21, 22-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65-99. To match
with the selected ACS sample whose ages are between 16-30, I combine the first four age spans 14-18, 19-21,
22-24, and 25-34.
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neighboring county (either by migration or by commuting), which causes disemployment in
the neighboring county. As a result, this spillover effect generates a common trend between
counties in one pair. When this pair-specific co-movement is controlled by the pair-specific
time effect, the estimates of local disemployment effect become less substantial.
4 Estimation strategy
4.1 Parametrization
To estimate the model, I need to make parametric assumptions for the types and moving
costs. To be consistent with the data, I assume workers are of two types: ah and al. High
type workers are workers with high school diplomas and above while low type workers are
high school dropouts. The proportion of these two types of workers are ph and pl.
I assume moving costs depend on a linear combination of worker’s type a, the physical
distance djj′ as well as the amenity difference γj − γj′ between the two counties.
(10) cch(a, j) =
 β0j + β0ddjj′ + β0aI(a = ah) + β0γ(γj − γj′)β1j + β1ddjj′ + β1aI(a = ah) + β1γ(γj − γj′)
if h = 0
if h = 1
Equation 10 follows the standard gravity equation for migration. βhj measures the relative
openness of labor market j, which is county-specific and differs by the mobility choice h.
The different impacts of distance on migrants and commuters are captured by β0d and β1d.
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I also assume the moving costs to be differ by types a. The coefficientsβ0a and β1a represent
the additional costs paid by high type workers. Lastly, I attribute the asymmetry between
the cost cch(a, j) and the cost cch(a, j
′) to different housing rental prices γj and γj′ , which
are proxies of local living cost.
Assuming parametric distribution for matching quality is necessary for identification pur-
poses. As Flinn and Heckman (1982), only a certain class of distributions satisfies the “re-
covery condition” necessary for identification. Following Flinn (2006) and Flinn and Mullins
(2015), I assume the matching quality distribution G(θ) follows a log-normal distribution.
Given the above assumptions, the economy is characterized by the vector S which combines
24While the distance between centroids is only a proxy for the real commuting time between two counties,
some evidence shows the correlation between these two measures is quite high (Phibbs and Luft (1995);Boscoe
et al. (2012)).
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a set of general parameters and a set of county-specific parameters.
S = {ρ, µG, σG, ah, al, β0d, β0a, β0r, β1d, β1a, β1γ , σ0, σ1} General⋃ {mj(n), bj(n), ηj(n), ψj(n), αj(n), ωj(n), γj(n), djj′(n), β0j(n), β1j(n), ph(n), pl(n)}(j,n)∈{1,2}×N County
The county-pair specific parameters are unique for every n ∈ N , while the general param-
eters are shared by all counties. Although the general parameters simplify the estimation,
the model remains computationally demanding if the county-pair specific parameters are
recovered non-parametrically. For tractability, I impose random coefficient assumptions the
unobserved county-specific variables sj(n) ∈ {bj(n), ψj(n), β0j(n), β1j(n)}.25 Given the close
connection between the paired counties, I draw s1(n) and s2(n) from a multivariate normal
distribution modeled for each sj(n) ∈ {bj(n), ψj(n), β0j(n), β1j(n)}:(
xs1
xs2
)
∼ N
([
µs
µs
]
,
[
σ2s1 ρsσs1σs2
ρsσs1σs2 σ
2
s2
])
where the correlation ρs captures the similarity between these two counties. The random
variables sj(n), j = 1, 2 are the mapping from the n − th draw of the following one-to-one
mapping F (which is 6×1),(
b1
b2
)
∼ N
([
µb
µb
]
,
[
σ2b ρbσ
2
b
ρbσ
2
b σ
2
b
])
(
logψ1
logψ2
)
∼ N
([
µψ
µψ
]
,
[
σ2ψ ρψσ
2
ψ
ρψσ
2
ψ σ
2
ψ
])
(
β0
β1
)
∼ N
([
µβ0
µβ1
]
,
[
σ2β0 ρβσβ0σβ1
ρβσβ0σβ1 σ
2
β1
])
Thus, the joint distributions of these six variables are fully characterized by 11 parame-
ters: 4 means, µs; 4 variances, σ
2
s ; and 3 correlations, ρs. These parameters (µs, σs, ρs : s ∈
{b, ψ, β0, β1}), in addition to those general parameters {ρ, µG, σG, ah, al, β0d, β0a, β0r, β1d, β1a, β1γ, σ0, σ1},
constitute the primitive parameters Ω of the model.
25The other county-specific parameters {mj(n), αj(n), γj(n), ηj(n), djj′(n), ph(n), pl(n)} j=1,2 are directly
observed in the data.
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4.2 The method of simulated moments
My model is estimated by the method of simulated moments (MSM). When combin-
ing moments from multiple databases, MSM is a more natural estimation approach than
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
Given Ω, I draw the unobserved variables
{
brj , ψ
r
j , β
r
0j, β
r
1j
}
j=1,2 R times from the distri-
butions of F for each county pair n. Combined with other observed county-level variables
{mj(n), αj(n), γj(n), ηj(n), djj′(n), ph(n), pl(n)} j=1,2 and general parameters {ρ, µG, σG, ah, al,
β0d, β0a, β0r, β1d, β1a, β1γ, σ0, σ1}, I then compute the vector of moments M˜N,R(Ω) from the
simulation. Model parameters are estimated by minimizing the weighted difference between
those simulated moments M˜N,R(Ω) and the actual data moments MN , using the following
quadratic distance function
ΩˆN,R,W = arg min
Ω
(
(MN − M˜N,R(Ω))′WN(MN − M˜N,R(Ω))
)
where MN denotes the data moments for all county pairs in the data set, and M˜N,R(Ω)
represents the simulated moment evaluated at Ω based on R simulations of N county pairs.
WN is a symmetric, positive-definite weight matrix constructed using the resampling method
of Del Boca et al. (2014). In particular, the resampled moment vector M gN , g = 1, ..., Q is
calculated by bootstrapping the original data Q times.26 Then, the weight matrix is the
inverse of the covariance matrix of MN :
Wn = Q
−1
(
Q∑
g=1
(M gN −MN)(M gN −MN)
)−1
Del Boca et al. (2014) show the consistency of this type of estimator for large simulations,
plimR→∞M˜N,R(Ω0) = MN(Ω0).27 Given identification and these regularity conditions,
plimN→∞plimR→∞ΩˆN,R,W = Ω for any positive definite W
26In practice, I set Q equal to 200.
27Compared with directly calculating the optimal weighting matrix, this method simplifies computation
significantly. Altonji and Segal (1996) discuss that gains from using an optimal weighting matrix may be
limited.
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4.3 Identification and selection of moments
My model is not nonparametrically identified, for reasons related to those given in Flinn
and Heckman (1982) and Flinn (2006). However, it is useful to briefly discuss the identifi-
cation in the model of Flinn (2006) given its close relationship with this paper. The model
in Flinn (2006) can be regarded as a special case of my model when there is only one type
of worker (al = ah), one pair of counties and no labor mobility (M(a, j) = 0). The only job
search decision for the worker is θ∗. Even in this specific case, the model is still unidentified
because accepted wage and duration information is not enough for nonparametric identi-
fication. He further shows that a center class of parametric distributional assumption G,
referred to as the “recoverability condition”, is required.28 In my model, given the assumed
log-normal distribution of matching quality, all parameters are identified except for the set
of discount factor and unemployment utility(ρ, b) because those parameters enter into the
likelihood function through the critical value θ∗. Parameters b, η,G, λ will be identified given
a fixed value of discount factorρ. Although I use the moments-based estimator rather than
the likelihood-based estimator in Flinn (2006), their identification argument can be carried
over in this paper given the same log-normal distribution assumption of θ and ex-ante fixed
value of ρ.29
This paper extends Flinn (2006) in two dimensions by incorporating multiple worker types
and multiple connected markets. As a result, instead of one critical value θ∗, individuals
make two optimal decisions: accept local offer if θ ≥ θ∗(a, j) and accept neighboring offer
if θ ≥ θ∗∗(a, j). Now I focus my attention on the log-wage distribution in one local county
j. There are four different group of workers: high type natives, low type natives, high
type movers, and low type movers. Given Equation 2, the log-wage distribution of local
workers and the distribution of mobile workers only differ in the truncated values of their
distributions. Besides the truncated log normal distribution, there is also a mass point as
the left end at value mj when the minimum wage is binding. As a result, the log wage
distribution R should be a left truncated normal distribution with a potential mass point
at its left end. We use R0 to represent the distribution for natives and R1 to represent the
28A comprehensive discussion about this “recoverability condition” can be found in Flinn and Heckman
(1982).
29The identification depends on the proper selection of moments to characterize the wage distribution. I
discuss this in Table 4.
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distribution for movers.
Natives logw(θ, a, j) ∼ R0(logw; a, µθ, σθ, αj,mj, θ∗)
Movers logw(θ, a, j) ∼ R1(logw; a, µθ, σθ, αj,mj, θ∗, θ∗∗)
Since the fractions of local workers L(a, j) and Mobile workers M(a, j) are observed for the
four groups of workers, it is straightforward to verify that the parameters µθ, σθ, al, ah, αj, θ
∗
are identified directly. To identify θ∗∗, one additional support condition θ∗∗(a, j) > mj
a
should
be satisfied. Otherwise, the mobile worker’s wage distribution R1 would be identical to local
workers’ wage distribution, leaving θ∗∗(a, j) unidentified.
Therefore, I use the fraction of movers Fr, to help identify θ∗∗(a, j) as well as the moving
cost term c(a, j). First of all, I note that
Fr(a, j) =
G˜(max{θ∗∗(a, j), mj′
a
})
G˜(max{θ∗(a, j), mj
a
})
Given that G˜ and θ∗(a, j) are already identified, the critical value θ∗∗(a, j) is identified
directly from the observed Fr(a, j).30 Moving costs can then be backed out from the following
one-to-one mapping:
c(a, j) =
αj′a(θ
∗∗(a, j)− θ∗(a, j′))
ρ+ ηj′
+
a(θ∗(a, j′)− θ∗(a, j))
ρ
Given the identified c(a, j) and observed migration/commuting choices P0(a, j) and P1(a, j),
the choice-specific moving cost cc0(a, j) and cc1(a, j) are identified by the logit assumption
of equation 10.
Althrough the bargaining power αj can be identified from R0 and R1, Flinn (2006) uses
a Monte Carlo experiment to show its practical power is tenuous. Because of this, I use
the average payroll share of firms’ expenditures from the Economy Wide Key Statistics
(EWKS), which is the U.S. government’s official five-year measure of American business and
the economy. This payroll share is calculated at the county level and provides cross-sectional
variation of the labor share αj.
The identification of the vacancy cost ψj follows from Equation 9 as long as the matching
technology ωj is known. Flinn (2006) uses multiple cross sections with different minimum
wages to identify ωj based on the assumption that the economy is in a steady-state in both
30θ∗∗(a, j) is potentially not identified when Fr(a, j) > 1, which means the number of movers are larger
than the number is local workers. However, this situation rarely happens empirically.
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Table 4: Selection of Moments
Empirical moments County j County j′ Identified
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Parameters
Moments from mean and S.D. in county pair p(j, j′)
Employment rate (high type) 0.881 0.083 0.886 0.078 µb, σb, µψ, σψ
Employment rate (low type) 0.785 0.127 0.761 0.127 µb, σb, µψ, σψ
Average hourly wage (high type) 13.63 2.47 - - µb, σb, ah, µG, σG
Average hourly wage (low type) 9.23 2.57 - - µb, σb, al, µG, σG
Proportion of migrants (high type) 0.073 0.050 0.070 0.046 µβ0, σβ0, β0a
Proportion of migrants (low type) 0.042 0.037 0.037 0.039 µβ0, σβ0, β0a
Proportion of commuters (high type) 0.113 0.127 0.096 0.106 µβ1, σβ1, β1a
Proportion of commuters (low type) 0.084 0.102 0.072 0.091 µβ1, σβ1, β1a
Correlation between migrants and commuters 0.630 - 0.523 - ρβ
Correlation between migrants and distance 0.149 - 0.014 - β0d
Correlation between commuters and distance 0.008 - -0.168 - β1d
Correlation between migrants and rent cost -0.103 - -0.056 - β0γ
Correlation between commuters and rent cost -0.116 - -0.110 - β1γ
Correlation between migrants and rent cost
Correlation between employments (high type) 0.318 - - - ρb, ρψ
Correlation between employments (low type) 0.211 - - - ρb, ρψ
Correlation between separation rate 0.599 - - - ρψ
Correlation between wage rate 0.498 - - - ρb, ρψ
Moments directly measure parameter values
Separation rates in county j(quarterly) 0.353 0.130 0.358 0.132 ηj
Bargaining power αj in county j 0.311 0.044 0.310 0.043 αj
Matching technology ωj in state s(j) 1.36 0.385 1.41 0.406 ωj
Centroid distance djj′ between j and j
′ 66.6 45.9 66.6 45.9 djj′
The median rent cost (local amenity γj) in j 683 168 683 178 γj
Note: (i) For details about the construction of the empirical moments, see Appendix C. (ii) County j represents the county
which increases its minimum wage, while county j′ is the county keeps the minimum wage fixed.
measurements and the vacancy cost is constant.31 In this paper, I use a market tightness
index (job demand/labor supply) constructed from the Conference Board Help Wanted On-
Line (HWOL) data, which is widely used in the macroeconomic literature as a direct measure
of matching technology that does not impose any additional assumptions.3233
Table 4 summarizes the empirical moments used to identify the model parameters.
31See the discussion of Condition C-Coherency in Flinn (2006) for more details.
32Beginning in 2005, HWOL provides a monthly series that covers the universe of vacancies advertised on
about 16,000 online job boards and online newspaper editions. While HWOL only collects the job openings
advertised online, its pattern is quite similar with the general pattern measured by JOLTS, especially before
2013. A detailed comparison between HWOL and JOLTS can be found in S¸ahin et al. (2014).
33See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey of these studies.
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Table 5: Model fit
Empirical moments County 1 County 2
Data Sim Data Sim
Employment rate (high type) 0.883 0.829 0.888 0.827
Employment rate (low type) 0.754 0.789 0.765 0.786
Hire rate 0.375 0.354 0.361 0.348
Average hourly wage (high type) 13.630 13.385 - -
Average hourly wage (low type) 9.230 9.156 9.230 9.156
Proportion of migrants (high type) 0.074 0.075 0.069 0.070
Proportion of migrants (low type) 0.043 0.047 0.038 0.045
Proportion of commuters (high type) 0.109 0.114 0.094 0.107
Proportion of commuters (low type) 0.082 0.143 0.071 0.131
Correlation between migrants and commuters 0.612 0.695 0.510 0.732
Correlation between migrants and distance 0.123 0.079 0.066 0.031
Correlation between commuters and distance -0.079 -0.011 -0.155 -0.071
Correlation between migrants and rent cost -0.101 -0.069 -0.063 -0.103
Correlation between migrants and rent cost -0.099 -0.029 -0.098 0.011
4.4 Model fit
My model reproduces many features of the data (Table 5). It predicts a higher employ-
ment rate and higher average hourly wage for high-type workers compared with those for
low-type workers. The fraction of migrants for both low-type workers and high-type workers
are also well matched. Although the fraction of high-type commuters is almost perfectly
predicted, the fraction of low-type commuters is over-predicted. My model also correctly
predicts the correlation between labor mobility patterns and the geographic characteris-
tics (rent prices and physical distance between paired counties). My model replicates the
negative correlation between mobility rates and housing prices. I observe low numbers of
migrants and commuters in counties with relatively high rental prices. On the other hand,
both simulation and data find a positive correlation between migration and distance but a
negative correlation between commuting and distance.
5 Estimation results
In this section, I present the parameter estimates and discuss their magnitudes. I then
compare the elasticities of migrants and comments with respect to minimum wage changes
predicted by the model with the elasticities estimated in the previous regressions. Finally, I
quantify the downward bias in the estimation of disemployment effect when ignoring labor
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Table 6: Parameter estimates
General parameters
Parameters Notation Mean µ S.D. σ Corr. τ
Matching quality θ 1.963 0.162 -
Unemployed flow utility b -23.8 0.123 0.949
Vacancy cost ψ 428 211 0.196
High type productivity ah 3.106 - -
Low type productivity al 1.406 - -
Commuting cost β0 48.5 1.217 0.458
Migration cost β1 78.4 9.709
Coefficients in equation cch(a, j)
Commuting (h = 0) Migration (h = 1)
Additional cost for high type β0a 2.222 β1a -4.927
Coefficient for different local amenity β0γ 2.884 β1γ 7.709
Coefficient for different distance β0d 0.697 β1d -2.051
Scale of preference shock (low type) σl 15.0
Scale of preference shock (high type) σh 25.0
mobility.
5.1 Understanding the model estimates
Table 6 provides model estimates for both the general parameters and the parameters
in the moving equation (Equation 10). The estimated value of unemployment, (bj, bj′), is
relatively homogeneous across counties. However, the vacancy cost ψ displays considerable
heterogeneity across counties. Its mean value is 428, which is equivalent to $68,480 if the filled
worker is required to work 160 hours/month. Furthermore, the large standard error suggests
substantial spatial diversification in vacancy costs. In addition, I find the productivity
of high educated workers is on average significantly higher than the productivity of low
educated workers (ah = 3.106 vs. al = 1.406). When comparing mobility costs, migrating
is more costly (β1 = 78.4) than commuting (β0 = 48.5), which explains why the fraction of
commuters is on average larger than the fraction of migrants.
The lower panel in Table 6 reports the the determinants of choice-specific moving costs
cch(a, j). The positive sign of β0a and negative sign of β1a indicate that, compared to low
educated workers, high educated workers are more likely to migrate when accepting the job
offers from a neighboring county. These two coefficients rationalize the observation that
when looking at commuting behavior, 40% of high educated workers are commuters whereas
only 34% of low educated workers are commuters. The next two coefficients, β0γ and β1γ
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Table 7: Moving costs and neighboring county preference
Lump-sum ex-ante moving cost (unit: $) Indifferent opportunity
Low educated High educated Low educated High educated
County j County j′ County j County j′ County j County j′ County j County j′
10th 7,749 7,773 7,648 7,626 0.010 0.008 0.022 0.014
25th 8,400 8,286 8,602 8,459 0.047 0.036 0.092 0.067
Median 8,794 8,760 9,262 9,210 0.222 0.181 0.229 0.211
75th 9,194 9,109 9,818 9,741 0.880 0.823 0.561 0.495
90th 9,691 9,544 10,410 10,365 1.023 1.018 0.997 0.974
Mean 8,693 8,683 9,098 9,067 0.407 0.373 0.367 0.336
SD 1,046 931 1,330 1,242 0.405 0.402 0.351 0.333
Note: the dollar value of ex-ante moving cost c(a, j) is estimated based on a representative full time worker whose
working time is 160 hours/month.
link the moving cost with the local housing rental price, which is regarded as a proxy of local
amenities . The positive values of β0γ and β1γ mean that high housing costs are associated
with high moving costs. Workers are less likely to take neighboring jobs when the housing
price in neighboring county is high. Even accepting the neighboring jobs, the mobile workers
are less likely to choose migration as their preferred moving option. The coefficients β0d and
β1d capture the correction between physical distance and moving cost. The positive sign
of β0d and negative sign of β1d reflects the pattern that more mobile workers would choose
migration over commuting as county pairs are farther apart. Lastly, the scale parameters
for low-educated workers is smaller than that for high educated workers.
Table 7 reports the distributions of moving costs. The left panel displays summary statis-
tics of the ex-ante moving costs c(a, j) for workers differentiated in their types and locations.
According to my estimates, the ex-ante moving cost is on average $8,700 for low type workers
and $9,100 for high type workers. These costs are summary statistics of relocation costs,
housing market transaction costs (for migrants only) and psychic costs.(Schwartz (1973),
Greenwood (1975)) The estimated moving costs are lower than previous ones reported in
the literature. For example, Kennan and Walker (2011) estimate a moving cost value of
$312,000 for an average movers across states in the US. And Schmutz and Sidibe (2016) find
the average moving cost among French cities is around ¿15,000. The moving costs in my
paper are lower for two reasons: first, I focus on the migration/commuting flows between two
contiguous counties. The geographic proximity could greatly reduce the potential moving
costs. Secondly. I focus on younger workers who are more likely to be affected by minimum
wages. The opportunity costs of moving for those workers are relatively low.
Moreover, the moving cost can be equivalently measured using the openness of the local
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labor market. The right panel illustrates this idea and calculates the possibility that a
random job from a neighboring county is preferred to a random job from the local county.
The probability distribution for low type workers are less diversified than that for high
type workers. The probability of preferring a neighboring county ranges from 0.010 (the
10th percentile) to 1.023 (the 90th percentile) for low educated workers in county j; this
probability shrinks to a range of 0.020 (the 10th percentile) to 0.997 (the 90th percentile) for
high educated workers. I also find this distribution is right skewed. In the median county,
the probability for a low-skilled worker to receive a preferred job from neighboring county
is 22.2%. This effect is comparable to the results of Manning and Petrongolo (2017). Using
UK data, they find that the probability of a random job 5km distant being preferred to
random local job is only 19%.
5.2 Out-of-sample validation: comparing model-based predictions
with regression results
In this section, I use the model to predict the minimum wage elasticities of commuters
and migrants and then compare the predicted elasticities to actual elasticities estimated
by regression 13. This comparison is treated as an extra out-of-sample validation since
the elasticities of commuters and migrants with respect to minimum wage are not used as
targeted moments when estimating the baseline model.
Given county specific parameters and local minimum wage levels, the model allows me to
calculate the fraction of migrants and commuters in each county . Specifically, the fraction of
migrants in county j given minimum wage pair MI(a, j;mj,mj′) is expressed as the number
of migrants from county j′ to county j, divided by the sum of local hires in county j, and
total mobile hires from county j′, i.e.
MI(a, j;mj,mj′) =
P1(a, j
′)U(a, j′)G˜(max{θ∗∗(a, j′), mj
a
})
U(a, j)G˜(max{θ∗(a, j′), mj
a
}) + U(a, j′)G˜(max{θ∗∗(a, j′), mj
a
})
Meanwhile, the fraction of commuters in county j given the local minimum wage pair
CM(a, j;mj,mj′) is given by the total number of commuters from county j, divided by
the sum of local hires in county j′ and all mobile workers (both commuters and migrants)
from county j, i.e.
CM(a, j;mj,mj′) =
P0(a, j)U(a, j)G˜(max{θ∗∗(a, j), mj′a })
U(a, j′)G˜(max{θ∗(a, j′), mj′
a
}) + U(a, j)G˜(max{θ∗∗(a, j), mj′
a
})
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When the minimum wage in county j increases from mj to mj + ∆mj but the minimum
wage in county j′ remains unchanged, I calculate new fractions of commuters CM(a, j;mj +
∆mj,mj′) and migrants MI(a, j;mj,mj′) in the new steady-state. The percentage changes
in labor mobility are defined as:
∆ logMI(a, j) = log(MI(a, j;mj + ∆mj,mj′)− logMI(a, j;mj,mj′)
∆ logCM(a, j′) = log(CM(a, j′;mj + ∆mj,mj′)− logCM(a, j′;mj,mj′)
Using data on minimum wage changes, I predict ∆ logMI(a, j) and ∆ logCM(a, j′).
Figure 2 displays the distributions of ∆ logMI(a, j) and ∆ logCM(a, j′) for different types.
First, all distributions show substantial heterogeneity across county-pairs, suggesting local
markets are diversified. Minimum wage hikes decrease the chance of finding a job but
increase the expected wages once hired. When the cost exceeds the benefit, the local labor
market becomes less attractive, and workers either move away or stop moving in. The mean
value of ∆ logCM(low, j) is positive (0.034) whereas the average value of ∆ logMI(low, j)
is negative (-0.034), both of which indicate that low-skilled workers are more likely to leave
areas with higher minimum wages in the majority of county pairs. Second, the distributions
for low-skill workers are more dispersed than those for high-skilled workers. This is in line
with the observation that low-skill workers are more responsive to minimum wage changes.
Next, I check the out-of-sample validation by comparing the model generated ∆ logMI(a, j)
and ∆ logCM(a, j′) with the data. In the sample, the percentage changes of migrants and
commuters are directly calculated by comparing the fractions of mobile workers before min-
imum wage changes with those after minimum wage changes. Then I run the following
regression to compute the minimum wage elasticity from model predictions (“Model-based
elasticity β∗1”) and from data observations (“Data-based elasticity β1”) separately:
(11)
∆ logMI(a, j) = β∗1∆logMWj + ∆0
∆ logCM(a, j) = β∗1∆logMWj + ∆1
The regression results based on the data were previously calculated in Table 10 since regres-
sion 11 is a simplified version of Equation 13 that ignores the county fixed effect and restricts
the observational period. Table 8 shows that the model-based β∗1 and the data-based β1 are
comparable. For low educated mobile workers, both estimates suggest that they exit counties
with minimum wage hikes. And the magnitudes of both elasticities are very similar (within
a 90% confidence interval). In addition, both estimates find the elasticities for low educated
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Figure 2: The distribution of ∆ logMI(a, j) and ∆ logCM(a, j′) after minimum wage hikes
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Table 8: The comparison between model predictions and regression results
Model-based (β∗1) Data-based (β1)
Low skilled Commuters 0.741*** 0.458**
(0.234) (0.215)
Low skilled Migrants -0.590** -0.589***
(0.260) (0.160)
High skilled Commuters -0.282*** 0.263**
(0.082) (0.133)
High skilled Migrants -0.081 -0.101
(0.080) (0.112)
Note: The regression column is directly from Table 10. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
* for 10%. ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.
workers(absolute value) are larger than the elasticities for high skilled workers. This is con-
sistent with the intuition that low educated workers are more responsive to the minimum
wage adjustments.
The model-based elasticity for more highly educated commuters is less consistent with
data-based elasticity. This discrepancy can be attributed to the distinction between short-
and long- run effects. Althrough the data-based β1 captures the immediate response after
the minimum wage change, the model-based β∗1 demonstrates cumulative changes between
two steady states.
This distinction between the short- and long-run effects is also emphasized in Sorkin
(2015). He argues that the reduced-from effects are essentially uninformative about the true
long-run elasticity. In my case, the key reason is the sorting of workers provides additional
feedback effects in the long run. When a local county increases its minimum wage, the
fraction of low type workers decreases in local county but increases in the neighboring county.
As the average worker quality improves in the local market, firms have more incentive to
post vacancies in local county rather than in neighboring county. However, this feedback
effect is hard to be observed in the short run since the adjustment of local worker quality is
slow. I will further explore this mechanism in Section 6.
5.3 Quantifying the underestimation of disemployment effects when
ignoring labor mobility
Starting with Card and Krueger (1994), cross-border comparisons became a common
method of studying the disemployment effects of the minimum wage. Dube et al. (2010) and
Dube et al. (2016) generalize this strategy to all county pairs and find limited disemploy-
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ment effects, which is consistent with Card and Krueger (1994). Although the cross-border
design allows one to assume similarity between the treated area and control area, it may
be problematic. As pointed out by Neumark et al. (2014b), “spillover effects can certainly
contaminate the control observations. If workers displaced by the minimum wage find jobs
on the other side of the border, employment will expand in the control areas”. Based on
my model, I quantitatively evaluate two sources of the underestimation of disemployment
effects. First, unemployed workers who leave are “missing” from the treated county. Second,
they may “reappear” in the neighboring county, contaminating the control group.
To evaluate the first channel, I compare the disemployment effect from two different
minimum wage increases. In case 1, both counties increase their minimum wage by the same
percentage (mj,mj′) → (mj + ∆mj,mj′ + ∆mj′). In case 2, only one county increases its
minimum wage (mj,mj′) → (mj + ∆mj,mj′). In case 1, the geographical minimum wage
differences are more compressed since the minimum wage increases in both counties rather
than increase only in one local county. Therefore, the opportunity to arbitrage relative
minimum wage differences are largely eliminated in case 1 compared with case 2. The
disemployment effect caused by minimum wage hikes is defined as the change of the log
employment rate under the steady-state before minimum wage change and the new steady-
state after the minimum wage change:
Case 1: ∆ logEmpj = logEmpj(mj + ∆mj,mj′ + ∆mj′) − logEmpj(mj,mj′)
Case 2: ∆ logEmpj = logEmpj(mj + ∆mj,mj′) − logEmpj(mj,mj′)
Figure 3 compares the distribution of ∆ logEmpj under case 1 and case 2. The average
value of ∆ logEmpj in case 1 is more negative than that in case 2 while the distribution of
∆ logEmpj in case 1 (red histogram) is more right-skewed than in case 2 (blue histogram).
86.9% of counties in case 1 experience negative employment changes due to minimum wage
hikes compared to only 82.0% in case 2. This comparison confirms that the spillover effect
actually attenuates the disemployment effect.
Next, I calculate the minimum wage elasticity of employment by estimating the following
regressions:
Case 1: ∆ logEmpj = β1∆logMWj + ∆1
Case 2: ∆ logEmpj = β2∆logMWj + ∆2
To include the potential bias caused by the contamination of control group, I recalculate the
disemployment elasticity in case 2 using the neighboring county as the control group. This
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Figure 3: The disemployment effect under different minimum wage hikes
calculation mimics the diff-in-diff approach:
Case 3: ∆ logEmpj −∆ logEmpj′ = β3∆logMWj + ∆3
Table 9 reports the minimum wage elasticity of employment in all three cases. “Case 1”
reports the elasticity of employment when both counties increase their minimum wages by
the same proportion. “Case 2” reports the elasticity of employment when only the local
county increases its minimum wage. Finally, “Case 3” displays the alternative elasticity if
the neighboring county is used as the control group. Workers in case 1 have less incentive to
arbitrage the minimum wage difference between two counties compared with their incentive
in case 2. Therefore, changes in labor mobility after minimum wage hikes in case 1 is smaller
than changes in case 2. Consequently, I observe a larger disemployment effect in case 1
(-0.0733) compared with case 2 (-0.0421). Furthermore, when using the neighboring county
as the control group, the disemployment effect continues to shrink from -0.0421 to -0.0341.
This shares the same pattern with the different disemployment effect estimated in Table
11. In Table 11, the minimum wage elasticity of employment changed from -0.068 to -0.039
after controlling for pair-specific time trends instead of a common time trend. Dube et al.
(2016) argue that this change is driven by spatial heterogeneity. My findings suggest that
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Table 9: Elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage
Case 1 (β1) Case 2 (β2) Case 3 (β3)
Whole Sample -0.0733*** -0.0421*** -0.0341***
(0.0069) (0.0075) (0.0096)
Below bottom quartile -0.0957*** -0.0445*** -0.0153
of moving cost (0.0163) (0.0136) (0.0190)
Note: “Case 1” reports the elasticity of employment when both county increase their minimum wages by the same proportion.
“Case 2” reports the elasticity of employment when only the local county increase its minimum wage. “Case 3” displays
an alternative elasticity if the neighboring county is wrongly picked as the control group. Standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. * for 10%. ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.
such changes are driven by labor mobility rather than by spatial heterogeneity. This result
highlights the concern that neighboring counties, despite their geographic proximity, may
not be the appropriate control group due to the contamination caused by labor mobility.
If labor mobility is causing underestimation of the disemployment effect, then the bias
should be larger for counties with lower moving costs. To verify this conjecture, I conduct an
additional placebo test for a sub-sample of counties whose moving costs are in the bottom
quartile. My estimates, reported in the second row of Table 9, are in line with this conjecture.
First, the difference of the elasticities between case 1 and case 2 becomes larger when using
the restricted sample. The main reason is that the disemployment effect in case 1 is larger (-
0.0957) compared with the previous effect (-0.0733) using the full sample. Second, using the
neighboring county as the control group creates more severe downward bias. Although the
elasticities in case 2 are robust to different sub-samples, it goes down sharply to -0.0153 in
case 3 when using the neighboring county as the control group. To summarize, ignoring labor
mobility and potential spillover effects cause the disemployment effect to be underestimated.
6 Policy experiments
In this section, I use the estimated model to examine the distributional impacts of local
minimum wage hikes. There are (at least) two criteria to evaluate the welfare consequences
of the minimum wage polices. The first natural welfare candidate is the value of unemploy-
ment Vu(a, j), which can also be interpreted as the ex-ante welfare of heterogeneous workers
with different types a and locations j. This is my primary measure because my goal is to
understand the distributional effects for heterogeneous workers under minimum wage hikes.
A second welfare criteria is defined for the local government, which is of particular inter-
est when considering the total spillovers of local minimum wage policy to the neighboring
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county. Following Flinn (2006), I assume that the minimum wage is the only policy instru-
ment available to the local government and the welfare function of local government defined
as follows:
Wj(mj) =
∑
a∈{al,ah}[L(a, j)V¯e(θ, a, j, θ
∗(a, j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1) Local employed workers
+MI(a, j)
(
V¯e(θ, a, j, θ
∗∗(a, j′))− c(a, j′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2) Migrants from neighbouring county
+ CM(a, j′)
(
V¯e(θ, a, j
′, θ∗∗(a, j′))− c(a, j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3) Commuters to the neighbouring county
+ U(a, j)Vu(a, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4) Unemployed workers
+ E(a, j)V¯f (a, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5) Revernue from filled vacancies
]− Kjψj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(6) Total cost of vacancies
where (1) L(a, j) is the population of local employed workers with V¯e(θ, a, j, θ
∗(a, j)) denoting
their average welfare. (2) MI(a, j) is the population of migrants who move from county
j′, with V¯e(θ, a, j, θ∗∗(a, j′)) − c(a, j′) as their average net welfare. (3) CM(a, j′) is the
population of migrants who commute to work in county j′, with V¯e(θ, a, j′, θ∗∗(a, j))− c(a, j)
as their average net welfare. (4) U(a, j) is the population of local unemployed workers (all
unemployed workers have same welfare level Vu(a, j)). On the demand side of the market,
while there are Kj vacancies in county j, only Mj =
∑
aE(a, j) are filled with workers and
generate positive revenue. The free entry condition guarantees that the revenue generated
from the filled vacancy is equal to the total cost of posted vacancies in the steady state.
Thus the total contribution of terms (5) and (6) is equal to 0.
To understand the distributional effects of local minimum wage hikes, it is important to
recognize the different forces at play. Assume county 1 changes its minimum wage while
county 2 keeps its minimum wage unchanged. The direct effect in county 1 depends on the
trade-off between the decrease in working opportunities (“disemployment effect”) and the
increase in expected income (“wage enhancement effect”). Because the productivity distri-
bution of high type workers first-order stochastically dominates that of low type workers ,
the working opportunity of the high type is less hurt by the same minimum wage increase
compared with that of low type workers. As a result, low type workers have stronger incen-
tives to move out of the country to avoid welfare losses caused by the minimum wage hike.
Besides the direct effects, there is an additional general equilibrium effect through the change
in a firm’s incentive to post vacancies. First, the share of matching surplus decreases when
firms are constrained by a higher minimum wage (“share reduction effect”). Secondly, due
to the assumption of random search, firms are unable to screen workers’ type when they post
vacancies. Thus, vacancies (per capita) will be negatively correlated with the proportion of
low type workers in their local county. Worker sorting decreases the composition of high
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type in county 2. As a result, the local workers in county 2 suffer additional welfare losses
because of the decrease in hiring probability (“composition changing effect”). The additional
force is the moving costs which generates welfare differences between the same type workers
in different locations. Compared with local workers, mobile workers have to pay additional
moving costs to work in the same job, ceteris paribus. This friction is traditionally referred
to as the lock-in effect.
After understanding the distributional effects of heterogeneous workers, I conduct two
counterfactual policies aiming for the reduction of spillover externalities. In the first policy
experiment, I completely restrict labor mobility between counties by increasing the moving
cost to infinity. This experiment captures the extreme case when no labor mobility is allowed.
In the second policy experiment, the central government preempts the local minimum laws.
In other word, the two paired counties follow universal minimum wage hikes rather than
setting up their local minimum wages. In reality, the preemption of local minimum wage
laws is a popular policy intervention for state legislation to avoid “patchwork” of wage levels
within a state. So far, 27 states have passed such laws.
6.1 The distributional effect of local minimum wage hikes
In this section I explore how the welfare of workers (differentiated by their type a and
location j) changes with respect to local minimum wage changes in county 1. To better
exclude the effect of local minimum wage hikes from other disturbances such as geographic
asymmetry, I consider symmetric county pairs where the geographic parameters in both
counties take the mean values of the distributional estimates. The distributional effects
depend critically on the magnitude of local minimum wage increases. I assume the initial
hourly minimum wage in both counties is $7 and consider welfare changes when increasing
the minimum wage in county 1 to an amount between $7 and $17. Most of my results
are presented in graphical form. I will first report the change in local economic conditions
(e.g. contact rates, the composition of heterogeneous workers). Then, I will compute welfare
changes with respect to changes in minimum wages for different workers. Lastly, I show
welfare changes of local governments with changes in minimum wages.
Figure 4 display changes in worker composition in both counties under different minimum
wage increases. As the local minimum wage in county 1 increases from $7 to $17, the fraction
of low type worker in county 1 monotonically decreases to 0.15 while the fraction of low type
workers in county 2 has a hump shape with a peak of 0.8 when m1 = $14. These two
patterns suggest that local minimum wage policy serves as a worker selection device. By
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Figure 4: Worker composition under different minimum wages
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setting a higher minimum wage, the local government extracts high type workers from the
neighboring county while also dumping low type workers on the neighboring county. The
prediction in my model is consistent with the real changes happening in Seattle after its
city-level minimum wage increases from $9.43/hour to $13/hour.(Jardim et al. (2017)) As
showed in figure 5, the number of low-pay job (wage < 19/hour) decreases while the number
of high-pay job ( wage > $19/hour) increases.
Next I consider the changes of firms’ incentive to post vacancies. Figure 6 displays
changes of contact rates in both counties and suggests two channels of changing the profit
of posted vacancies. First, for the same match, firms get less value per vacancy when the
minimum wage is higher. A higher minimum wage decreases both the probability that a
given match is acceptable and makes the sustainable match less profitable. This channel
explains why contact rates in both counties experience a downward change when minimum
wage in county 1 increases. Second, the sorting of workers increases the concentration of
high types in county 1 but decreases their concentration in county 2 because firms tend to
post relatively fewer vacancies in the county with higher fraction of low type workers. The
second channel explains why the contact rate in county 2 is systematically lower than that
in county 1. Furthermore, the fraction of low type in county 2 reaches its peak at $14 and
starts to decrease after that, which explains the rebound of the contact rate in county 2
when m1 ≥ $15.
The most crucial results are the distributional effects of local minimum wage policies
on heterogeneous workers. This heterogeneity is not well explored in the previous litera-
ture because workers are often considered to be ex-ante identical (e.g. Flinn (2006)). Let
Vu(a, j;m1,m2) be the ex-ante welfare for a worker with type a and in location j when m1
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Figure 5: Changes in Seattle jobs after increasing minimum wage from $9.43 to $13
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Data source: administrative employment records from the Washington Employment Security Depart-
ment, reported in Jardim et al. (2017), table 3.
Figure 6: Contact rates under different minimum wages
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
The level of minimum wage
0.26
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.3
0.31
0.32
0.33
0.34
0.35
0.36
Th
e 
Co
nt
ac
t r
at
e 
λ
The contact rate λ j
County 1
County 2
40
is set at m and m2 is set at $7, then the change of welfare is defined as
∆W0(a, j;m, 7) = Vu(a, j;m, 7)− Vu(a, j; 7, 7)
Figure 7 shows the results. The top left panel displays welfare changes of low type
workers in both county 1 (the blue line) and county 2 (the red line). The low type is severely
harmed by higher minimum wages. As noted previously, this is driven by a combination of
two effects. First, the higher m1 rules out previously acceptable wages. Second, the higher
minimum wage policy in county 1 pushes low type workers to county 2, diminishing their
probability to be hired. The top right panel displays the welfare changes of high type workers
in both county 1 (the blue line) and county 2 (the red line). The hump shape in high type
welfare shows the existence of countervailing effects. Although raising the minimum wage
increases workers’ welfare by increasing the return of a match, previously acceptable matches
become unacceptable. The latter effect dominates the previous effect when local minimum
wage in county 1 exceeds $14.
The lower panel of Figure 7 reports the change of inequality between high type and low
type as minimum wage increase in county 1. Because the welfare of the low type is a convex
curve whereas the welfare of the high type is a concave curve, the inequality curve expands
and then reaches its peak when m1 = 15. This result reveals that local minimum wage policy
could actually increase inequality between high and low type workers, completely opposite
of the intended policy effect.
Lastly, the welfare difference between same type workers in two counties indicates the
“lock-in” effects due to the existence of moving costs, I will continue to explore this effect in
the next section.
Figure 8 plots the change of total welfare in each county with respect to a change in the
local minimum wage. The total welfare in county 1 has a single peak at m1 = 8, while the
total welfare in county 2 declines until m1 = 16. An increase in m1 almost always harms the
total welfare in county 2. Put another way, the increases in local minimum wages generate
negative externalities to neighboring counties.
6.2 Restricting labor mobility between counties
In this session, I want to reduce spillover externalities by completely blocking labor mo-
bility between counties. This can be treated as an extreme way of implementing mandatory
local hiring requirements. For example, the public infrastructure projects in San Francisco
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Figure 7: Welfare changes across heterogeneous workers under different minimum wage
increases
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Figure 8: Changes in local government welfare as minimum wage changes in county 1
(a) Changes in local government welfare - county 1
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(b) Changes in local government welfare - county 2
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require that at least 50% of their job hours to go to San Francisco residents. I achieve this
moving barrier in the model by setting the moving cost to be infinite (c(a, j) = +∞) so that
the two labor markets are totally disconnected, which is referred as “Autarky case”.
Figure 9 compares the ex-ante welfare across different types of workers in the “Baseline”
and “Autarky” cases. In the “Autarky” case, a minimum wage increase in county 1 has no
effect on the workers in county 2, because these two labor markets are totally segregated.
Therefore, the welfare of worker in county 2 (green line) is a horizontal line in the “Autarky”
case. The welfare in the “Baseline” case and in the “Autarky” case differ because of two
effects. First, workers in the “Baseline” case have additional working opportunities from
the neighboring county, which generate welfare gains for all types of workers. Secondly, the
sorting of workers discourages firms from posting vacancies in county 2. This reduction of
contact rates in county 2 has a negative effect on all workers, but particularly on lower type
workers, because they are more concentrated in county 2 when m1 increases. Taken together,
welfare increases for everyone except for the low skill worker in county 2. When m1 > 10,
they would prefer to stay in the “Autarky” case to avoid the negative spillover effects.
6.3 Preempting local minimum wage laws (universal (federal) min-
imum wages vs. local minimum wages)
In this section, I perform a second counterfactual experiment: preempting local min-
imum wage laws. In reality, the preemption of local minimum wage laws is a popular
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Figure 9: Change in worker welfare both in “Baseline” case and “Autarky” case
(a) Welfare - Low type in county 1
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(b) Welfare - Low type in county 2
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(c) Welfare - High type in county 1
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(d) Welfare - High type in county 2
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Figure 10: Changes in total welfare under local and under universal (federal) minimum wages
(a) Changes in local government welfare - county 1
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(b) Changes in local government welfare - county 2
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policy intervention adopted by either federal or state legislatures to avoid a “patchwork”
of minimum wage levels within their justification. Sometimes, progressive legislatures offer
a statewide/nationwide raise to avoid more aggressive local level minimum wage changes.
To understand the trade-off between universal level minimum wage hikes and local level
minimum wage hikes, I consider the case in which both counties have an identical increase
of their same minimum wages. Thus welfare changes of heterogeneous workers when setting
a universal federal minimum wage at m is defined as
∆W0(a, j;m,m) = Vu(a, j;m,m)− Vu(a, j; 7, 7)
Figure 10 compares welfare changes under local minimum wage regulation and welfare
changes under universal minimum wage regulation. Rather than keeping m2 unchanged, a
universal minimum wage policy equalizes the minimum wages in both counties, m1 = m2.
Compared with the “Baseline” case, the increase of m2 generates two offsetting effects. On
one hand, the minimum wage hikes in county 2 dissolves previously acceptable matches. On
the other hand, the increase of m2 prevents the sorting of workers between two counties,
encouraging firms to post more vacancies. As shown in the right panel of Figure 10, the
benefit of preventing negative spillovers dominates the cost of losing acceptable matches
when m < 13.5. When minimum wage is not dramatically high, the total welfare in county 2
is actually higher under universal minimum wage policy. When the minimum wage exceeds
$13.5, the total welfare in both counties is reduced, because the loss of sustainable matches
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Figure 11: Change in worker welfare under local and universal (federal) minimum wage
changes
(a) Changes in welfare - low type in county 1
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(b) Changes in welfare - low type in county 2
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(c) Changes in welfare - high type in county 1
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(d) Changes in welfare - high type in county 2
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becomes the dominant effect.
When decomposing total local welfare by worker types, I find preferred minimum wage
regulation (universal vs. local) in county 2 is driven by low type workers. Thus, a plan-
ner that cares for low type workers should opt for universal rather than local minimum
wage intervention when the change is moderate (m < $14.5). However, this welfare gain is
accompanied with a welfare loss for high type workers.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, I developed a spatial search model to study the effect of both local and
universal (federal) minimum wage policies. In the model, firms endogenously choose where
to post vacancies. Workers, differentiated by their type and location, engage in random
search and can either accept a local job or migrate/commute to work in the neighboring
county. My model captures three important effects associated with the minimum wage
increases. First, conditional on being employed, a higher minimum wage shifts profits from
firms to workers and increases workers’ earnings. Second, a higher minimum wage also creates
a disemployment effect by dissolving previously acceptable matches. This disemployment
effect is more for low type worker. Third, firms reduce their vacancy postings in response
to changing county-level worker composition and because they receive a smaller share of the
matching surplus. Although the reduction in contact rates affects both counties, it has a
larger effect on the neighboring county.
My analysis yields a number of interesting empirical findings when simulating the effects
of minimum wage increases in county 1 with no change in county 2. First, minimum wage
increases up to $14/hour increase the welfare of high type workers but lower the welfare of
low type workers, leading to an increase in inequality. Minimum wage increases in excess
of $14/hour lower the welfare of all workers, because the wage increases do not compensate
for the disemployment effects. Second, the welfare of same type workers differs by locations
(“lock-in effect”) due to migration/commuting costs. Lastly, I find the disemployment effect
of a minimum wage increase is underestimated if one ignores labor mobility. With the model,
I obtain with the model a minimum wage elasticity of employment equal to -0.073; ignoring
labor mobility cuts this value in half to -0.034. The bias is most severe for the counties with
higher fractions of mobile workers.
I examine two counterfactual policies aiming for reducing spillover externalities: restrict-
ing labor mobility and preempting local minimum wage laws. In the experiment restricting
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labor mobility, the low type workers in neighboring county (the county without minimum
wage change) prefer “Autarky” labor markets when the increase of local minimum wage
is large (m > $10). In the experiment of preempting local minimum wage laws, low type
workers prefer a universal (federal) minimum wage rather than local minimum wages when
the increa se of minimum wage is moderate (m < $14.5). In contrast, the welfare of high
type reduces unambiguously under both policies.
There are several ways to extend my analysis for future research. First, my model only
compares the change between two steady states with minimum wage hikes. Adding tran-
sitional dynamics could capture the immediate effect of minimum wage hikes, which might
differ from the long-term steady-state. Second, although I emphasize the worker selection
and reallocation consequences of the local minimum wage policy, the local government is not
a strategic player in my current model. Examining the competitive behavior of policy makers
could be interesting. Third, local minimum wages also affect labor force participation. With
higher minimum wages, individuals who were out of the labor force may also start to look
for jobs in the labor market. This feature could be added into the model where government
not only cares about the working population, but also the sub-population out of the labor
force.
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A Expression appendix
A.1 Deducing the expressions of vuj(a, j), vuj′(a, j) and Ve(w, a, j)
I now consider individual’s search problem
vuj(a, j) = (1 + ρ)
−1[ abj+ λj
∫ ∞
mj
max{Ve(w, j), Vu(a, j)}dF (w|a, θ, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A local offer arrives
+ λj′
∫ ∞
mj′
max{Ve(w, j′)− c(a, j), Vu(a, j)}dF (w|a, θ, j′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A neighbouring offer arrives
+ +(1− λj− λj′)Vu(a, j) + o()]
Multiplying 1 + ρ then subtracting Vu(a, j) from both sides, I get
ρVu(a, j) = abj+ λj
∫ ∞
mj
max{Ve(w, j), Vu(a, j)}dF (w|a, θ, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A local offer arrives
+ λj′
∫ ∞
mj′
max{Ve(w, j′)− c(a, j), Vu(a, j)}dF (w|a, θ, j′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A neighbouring offer arrives
+ −(λj+ λj′)Vu(a, j) + o()
Dividing both sides by  and taking limits → 0, I arrive at
ρVu(a, j) = abj + λj
∫ ∞
mj
{Ve(w, j)− Vu(a, j)}+dF (w|a, θ, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A local offer arrives
+ λj′
∫ ∞
mj′
{Ve(w, j′)− c(a, j)− Vu(a, j)}+dF (w|a, θ, j′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A neighbouring offer arrives
The value of employment with wage w is
Ve(w, a, j) = (1 + ρ)
−1{w+ ηjVu(a, j) + (1− ηj)Ve(w, a, j) + o()}
Multiplying 1 + ρ then subtracting Ve(a, j) from both sides, I get
ρVe(w, a, j) = w+ ηjVu(a, j)− ηjVe(w, a, j) + o()
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Dividing both sides by  and taking limits → 0, I arrive at
Ve(w, a, j) =
w + ηjVu(a, j)
ρ+ ηj
A.2 Solving for the bargained wage equation without the mini-
mum wage constraint
Follow the same deduction procedure, the firm’s value for a match with wage w, V ft (w, a, θ, j),
is(I assume that the effective discount fact ρ+ ηj is the same as worker’s):
Vf (w, a, θ, j) =
aθ − w
ρ+ ηj
Then the Nash bargaining wˆ(θ, a, j) without considering possible binding minimum wage is:
(12)
wˆ(a, j, θ) = arg maxw(Ve(w, a, j)− Vu(a, j))1−αjVf (w, a, θ, j)1−αj
= arg maxw(
w+ηjVu(a,j)
ρ+ηj
− Vu(a, j))1−αj (aθ−wρ+ηj )αj
= arg maxw(
w−ρVu(a,j)
ρ+ηj
)1−αj (aθ−wρ+ηj )
αj
= αjaθ + (1− α)ρVu(a, j)
A.3 The derivation of fixed point system of θ∗(a, j) and θ∗∗(a, j)
I start from the expression of unemployed value Vu(a, j), equation ??:
ρVu(a, j) = abj + λj
∫ ∞
mj
{Ve(w, j)− Vu(a, j)}+dF (w|a, θ, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A local offer arrives
+ λj′
∫ ∞
mj′
{Ve(w, j′)− c(a, j)− Vu(a, j)}+dF (w|a, θ, j′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A neighbouring offer arrives
Now, I replace the term Ve(a, j, θ) in the above equation using the following step-wise func-
tion:
Ve(a, j, θ) =

mj+ηjVu(a,j)
ρ+ηj
αj(aθ−ρVu(a,j))
ρ+ηj
+ Vu(a, j)
θ ∈ [mj, θˆ(a, j))
θ ∈ [θˆ(a, j),∞)
Then I replace ρVu(a, j) with its equivalent definition aθ
∗(a, j) then get:
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aθ∗(a, j) = abj +
λj
ρ+ηj
[I (θ∗(a, j) <
mj
a
)(mj − aθ∗(a, j))
(
G˜(θˆ(a, j))− G˜(mj
a
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Local offer with wage mj
+
∫
max{θˆ(a,j),θ∗(a,j)}
aαj(θ − θ∗(a, j))dG(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Local offer with wage wj > mj
]
+
λj′
ρ+ηj′
[I(θ∗∗(a, j) <
mj′
a
)(mj′ − aθ∗(a, j′))
(
G˜(θ∗∗(a, j))− G˜(mj′
a
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Neighbouring offer with wage mj′
+
∫
max{θˆ(a,j′),θ∗∗(a,j)}
aαj(θ − θ∗(a, j′))dG(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Neighbouring offer with wage wj′ > mj′
+ (ρ+ ηj′) (
a(θ∗(a, j)− θ∗(a, j′))
ρ
+ c(a, j))G˜(θ∗∗(a, j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
The unemployed value difference between staying/moving
]
B Preliminary regression results
B.1 Both migrants and commuters are responsive to minimum
wage hikes
This section presents the responses of migrants and commuters to minimum wage hikes.
I find that low educated workers tend to commute/migrate away from states with higher
relative minimum wage (compared to its neighboring state) rather than towards them. More
specifically, the fraction of workers commuting out of the state increases and the number of
individuals migrating into the local county from other states decreases.
I use the following regression to measure the effect of the relative minimum wage ratio
on worker’s migration and commuting behaviors:34
(13) log yc,t = β0 + β1 log
MWs(c),t
MWs′(c),t
+ c,t
34Ideally, I would distinguish the effect of the own state’s minimum wages from the effect of the neighboring
state’s minimum wages by using the following regression:
log yc.t = β0 + β1 logMWs(c),t + β
′
1 logMWs′(c),t + c,t
However, due to the high correlation between MWs(c),t and MWs′(c),t, the estimates suffer multicollinearity
and become too sensitive to model specification. Therefore, I put the restriction β1 = −β′1 to deliver more
stable estimates.
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Here yc,t is the ratio of migrants or commuters in county c, at time t. I estimate sepa-
rate regressions for each education group. The minimum wage ratio
MWs(c)t
MWs′(c)t
compares the
minimum wage of s(c), the state containing county c, to the minimum wage of s′(c), the
neighboring state of county c. The coefficient β1 is the primary parameter of interest, which
is the elasticity of outcomes yit with respect to the relative minimum wage ratio.
Regression estimates are reported in Table 10. Column (1) reports the elasticity of the
flows of migrants and commuters with respect to the change of relative minimum wage
ratio. I use the relative minimum wage ratio rather than the absolute minimum wage levels
to allow the flexibility that migration and commuting could be driven by either the own
state’s minimum wage hikes or the neighboring state’s minimum wage increases. I find
that minimum wage changes have a statistically significant negative effect for low educated
migrants. In response to a 1% hike in the relative minimum wage ratio, the flows of low-
educated migrants decrease by 0.539%. For commuters, these flows increase by 0.458% in
response to a 1% increase in the relative minimum wage ratio.
However, observed commuting and migration changes could respond to other factors
happening simultaneously with minimum wage increases. For example, if the local economic
conditions are declining for the states with minimum wage increases, I would misattribute
these changes to minimum wage changes instead of local economic conditions. Column (2)
estimates the same regression model for high educated workers. If local conditions were un-
derlying the observed changes of labor mobility, then high educated workers should present
similar patterns, but that is not the case. There is no statistically significant migration
response and only moderate commuting response to the same minimum wage increase.35
While the evidence above does not prove causality, it is consistent with the view that mini-
mum wage policy should have asymmetric effects on workers with different educational levels.
Compared with low educated workers, the high educated group receives a higher wage on av-
erage, yielding a lower probability to be bound by minimum wage increases. Another concern
is that the state-level minimum wage policy may move in tandem with other redistribution
policies, such as unemployment insurance benefits, which may also cause asymmetric effects
on workers with different levels of education. To minimize this concern, I restrict my sam-
ple to the period covered by The Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007.36 It is worth noting
35I ran the same regression only for the high-school graduates, which are more closely related to high-
school dropouts. The estimates are very close to the estimates for the whole high educated group. (This
regression result is not reported in table 10)
36The Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 was implemented by three stages. Stage one increased the minimum
wage from $5.15 to $5.85 in 2007. Stage two continued to increase it to $6.55 in 2009. Then the final stage
finalized the minimum wage in the level of $7.25 in 2009. Thus I restrict my sample to year 2007-2009 to
include the total effect of federal minimum wage change.
57
T
ab
le
10
:
M
ig
ra
n
t
an
d
C
om
m
u
te
r
F
lo
w
s
in
R
es
p
on
se
to
M
in
im
u
m
W
ag
e
R
at
io
C
h
an
ge
s
B
a
se
li
n
e
sa
m
p
le
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
sa
m
p
le
A
lt
er
n
a
ti
ve
E
xt
en
d
ed
sa
m
p
le
y i
t
(1
)
L
o
w
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
(2
)
H
ig
h
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
(3
)
W
h
o
le
sa
m
p
le
(4
)
L
o
w
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
(5
)
H
ig
h
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
(6
)
W
h
o
le
sa
m
p
le
(7
)
L
o
w
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
M
ig
ra
n
ts
-0
.5
8
9
*
*
*
-0
.1
0
1
-0
.0
9
3
-0
.6
8
2
*
*
0
.0
8
2
-0
.1
4
8
*
*
*
-0
.4
1
7
*
*
*
(0
.1
60
)
(0
.1
1
2
)
(0
.1
0
7
)
(0
.3
1
5
)
(0
.1
5
6
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.1
4
0
)
5,
82
8
8,
2
6
6
8
,3
3
0
1
,7
1
1
2
,6
6
4
1
0
,4
5
9
7
,1
2
3
C
o
m
m
u
te
rs
0
.4
5
8
*
*
0
.2
6
3
*
*
0
.2
7
8
*
*
0
.6
7
8
*
0
.3
7
8
*
*
0
.2
1
2
*
*
*
0
.4
4
2
*
*
(0
.2
15
)
(0
.1
3
3
)
(0
.1
3
4
)
(0
.3
7
9
)
(0
.1
3
9
)
(0
.0
7
9
)
(0
.2
0
5
)
4,
50
1
7,
2
7
0
7
,1
2
9
9
3
4
1
,7
9
4
6
,4
9
1
5
,1
1
7
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
P
a
ir
F
E
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
ea
r
F
E
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
C
en
tr
io
d
s
<
75
m
i
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
T
h
e
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
co
effi
ci
en
ts
a
ss
oc
ia
te
d
w
it
h
th
e
lo
g
o
f
re
la
ti
ve
m
in
im
u
m
w
a
ge
ra
ti
o
(l
o
g
M
W
s
t
M
W
s
t
)
o
n
th
e
lo
g
o
f
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
bl
es
n
o
te
d
in
th
e
fi
rs
t
co
lu
m
n
.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
o
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
bo
th
co
u
n
ty
fi
xe
d
eff
ec
ts
a
n
d
y
ea
r
fi
xe
d
eff
ec
ts
.
C
o
lu
m
n
s
(1
)-
(3
)
p
ro
vi
d
e
es
ti
m
a
te
s
fo
r
a
ll
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
be
tw
ee
n
1
6
-3
0
ba
se
d
o
n
p
se
u
d
o
co
u
n
ty
-l
ev
el
va
ri
a
ti
o
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
by
A
C
S
P
U
M
S
be
tw
ee
n
y
ea
r
2
0
0
5
-2
0
1
5
.
C
o
lu
m
n
(6
)
u
se
s
IR
S
d
a
ta
.
T
h
e
va
ri
a
bl
e
“
M
ig
ra
n
ts
”
is
co
ll
ec
te
d
by
th
e
IR
S
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
o
f
In
co
m
e
D
iv
is
io
n
(S
O
I)
,
y
ea
r
0
5
-1
5
.
T
h
e
va
ri
a
bl
e
“
C
o
m
m
u
te
rs
”
is
ex
tr
a
ct
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
co
u
n
ty
-l
ev
el
A
C
S
(0
9
-1
5
)
th
ro
u
gh
th
e
in
te
rf
a
ce
ca
ll
ed
A
m
er
ic
a
n
F
a
ct
F
in
d
er
(w
eb
:h
tt
p
s:
/
/
fa
ct
fi
n
d
er
.c
en
su
s.
go
v/
)
In
C
o
lu
m
n
(5
)-
(6
),
th
e
sa
m
p
le
is
re
st
ri
ct
ed
to
y
ea
r
2
0
0
7
-2
0
0
9
w
h
en
th
e
th
e
F
a
ir
M
in
im
u
m
W
a
ge
A
ct
o
f
2
0
0
7
is
en
fo
rc
ed
.
F
o
r
C
o
lu
m
n
(7
),
th
e
sa
m
p
le
is
ex
te
n
d
ed
to
a
ll
co
u
n
ty
-p
a
ir
s.
R
o
bu
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
,
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
,
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
th
e
pa
ir
ed
-c
o
u
n
ty
le
ve
ls
.
*
fo
r
1
0
%
.
*
*
fo
r
5
%
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
fo
r
1
%
.
S
a
m
p
le
si
ze
s
a
re
re
po
rt
ed
be
lo
w
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
r
fo
r
ea
ch
re
gr
es
si
o
n
.
58
that the federal minimum wage compresses the minimum wage difference between contigu-
ous counties. Therefore, the federal minimum wage should generate the opposite effect for
states bound by the federal minimum wage: the commuting flows increase while the mi-
gration flows decrease. Columns (4) and (5) report values that are slightly higher (-0.682
and 0.678 compared to -0.589 and 0.458) than my baseline estimates for the low-education
group, but not significantly different. The estimates for the high educated group are also
similar to my baseline estimates. The elasticity of migration is not statistically significant
and the elasticity of commuting is significantly positive but moderate in its magnitude. To
sum up, my results are robust to the restricted sample only using the federal-level minimum
wage variation, which supports the hypothesis that the potential endogenity of state-level
minimum wage change does not bias the estimates.
Another concern is that pseudo county-based statistics may be imprecise. To mitigate
this concern, I re-run the same regressions using different data sources in Column (6). The
alternative migration data comes from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which collects the
year-to-year address changes reported on individual income tax returns between 2005-2015.37
The alternative commuting data comes from the 2009-2015 aggregated county-level ACS.38
Unfortunately, these two alternative data sets lacks workers’ demographic characteristics.
Therefore, I can only compare estimates based on the full sample rather than estimates of
subgroups classified by their education levels. The estimates using alternative data have
similar values but different level of statistical significance. The elasticities of migration and
commuting when using alternative data sets are -0.148 and 0.212 compared to my baseline
estimates of -0.093 and 0.278.39
Lastly, I do another robustness check on the selection of contiguous county pairs. Fol-
lowing Dube et al. (2016), the baseline regression includes county pairs whose centriods are
within 75 kilometers because the counties with closer centriods have more similar labor mar-
kets. In column (7), I run the same specification using all county pairs. Compared with
37IRS data is more robust than other data for a few reasons. First, IRS data covers 95 to 98 percent
of the individual income tax filing population. Furthermore, the IRS and ACS display similar declines in
migration after 2005, which is not true for other data such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the Current Population Survey (CPS). A
detailed discussion comparing different migration data sets can be found in Molloy et al. (2011).
38This is collected from the American FactFinder which only provides aggregate moments. Thus it
is impossible to further disaggregate moments to get conditional ones on workers’ characteristic. See
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtmlfor details.
39The larger variance of my baseline estimates is due to the imputation process. One PUMA usually
contains several counties, which washes away the inter-county variation when converting the PUMA-based
statistics into the county-based statistics. Consequently, the “pseudo” county-level variation should be
smaller than the “true” county-level variation, which results in less significant estimates.
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Table 11: Minimum wage elasticity for employment stocks and flows
yit (1) (2)
Hires -0.156*** 0.012
(0.017) (0.045)
84,140 83,280
Separations -0.190*** -0.024
(0.017) (0.022)
84,120 83,246
Employment -0.068*** -0.039**
(0.017) (0.017)
84,140 83,280
Earnings 0.056*** -0.016
(0.015) (0.015)
84,140 83,280
Controls
County fixed effect Y Y
Common time effects Y
Pair-specific time effects Y
Centriods <75mi Y Y
Data source: 2005-2015 Quarterly Workforce Indicator (QWI). This table reports the elasticity of the labor market outcomes
listed in the first column. The regression sample is restricted to the counties from 964 county-pairs whose centriods are within
75 miles and includes all workers whose age is between 14-34. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the the
paired-county level. * for 10%. ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.
the estimates using the baseline sample, the elasticities for low educated group are smaller
but not different from my baseline estimates. This makes sense because as physical distance
increases, workers have less incentive to take opportunities in the neighboring market since
moving costs are higher. The regression results in this section suggest that low educated
workers tend to move away from counties with minimum wage increases, either by commuting
or migration.
B.2 The disemployment effect of local minimum wage hikes
In this section, I show additional evidence that the increase of outflows in response to a
minimum wage increase is caused by the decline of local working opportunities. Following
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Dube et al. (2007) and Dube et al. (2016), I run the following regression:
(14) log yc,t = β0 + β1 logMWs(c),t + β2Xc,t + φc + ηp(c),t + c,t
where yc,t refers to the local labor market variables, including earnings, employment, sepa-
rations and hires, in county c and period t. Xc,t is the log of the total local population. The
coefficient β1 is the primary variable of interest representing the elasticity of yit with respect
to the local minimum wages. Table 11 reports two regressions which only differ in their spec-
ification of the time-fixed effect. In Column (1), I restrict the time fixed effect to be common
across all county pairs (ηp(c),t = ηt) and I find statistically significant disemployment effects
in response to local minimum wage changes. The estimated elasticity of employment stock
is -0.156. Meanwhile, the elasticities of employment flows are also substantial with minimum
wage increases. The hire elasticity and separation elasticity are -0.190 and -0.156, both of
which are statistically significant. The fact that the separation elasticity is larger than the
hire elasticity is consistent with the negative effect of minimum wage on employment stock.
However, when I account for the pair-specific time fixed effect (to control for time-varying,
pair-specific spatial confounders), the estimates for the hire elasticity and separation elas-
ticity are not distinguishable from zero. I attribute this change to the existence of spatial
spillover effect. After the local county increases its own minimum wage, unemployed workers
may seek their jobs in the neighboring county (either by migration or by commuting), which
causes disemployment in the neighboring county. As a result, this spillover effect generates
a common trend between the counties in one pair. When this pair-specific co-movement is
teased out by pair-specific time effect, the estimates of local disemployment effect become
less substantial.
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C Sample construction appendix
C.1 Minimum wage policies between 2005-2015
In this section, I consider changes of minimum wage policies both on the state and
federal level (See Table 12).40 Between 2005 and 2015, there was only one change to federal
minimum wage law, the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007.41 While 78 changes in minimum
wage resulted from the Act, the other 164 events were due to state ordinances. Table 12
highlights two important patterns. First, at least 5 states change their effective minimum
wage every year. Second, there is significant variation in how often states change their
minimum wages. For example, Georgia only changed its minimum wage three times in
line with federal minimum wage policy. On the contrary, its neighbor, Florida, makes the
most minimum wage adjustments, changing 11 times.42 Overall, the effective minimum wage
increases $0.54 per change on average, but with substantial variation (Table 13). The largest
change ($1.90) happened in Michigan in 2005, while the smallest increment ($0.04) happened
in Florida in 2010.
One limitation is the scarcity of city-level minimum wage ordinances. Before 2012, only
five localities had their own minimum wage laws. As of September 2017, 39 counties and
cities have passed local minimum wage ordinances. Due to limited data, I evaluate the effect
of county-level minimum wage indirectly. I estimate the baseline model using state-level
minimum wage variation but focus on the resulting county-level labor market outcomes.
Then, the effect of the county-level minimum wage will be inferred using contiguous border
county pairs.
40David et al. (2016) document all minimum wage law changes between 1979-2012. My table differs slightly
from David et al. (2016) because I extend the sample through 2015 and include DC. Additionally, I have
corrected errors in the minimum wages of Pennsylvania and Colorado.
41The Act raised the federal minimum wage in three stages: to $5.85 60 days after enactment (2007-07-24),
to $6.55 one year after that (2008-07-24), then finally to $7.25 one year after that (2009-07-24).
42Two changes happened in 2009.
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Table 12: Variation in State Minimum Wages (2005-2015)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Changes
Federal MW 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.85 6.55 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 3
Alabama 3
Alaska 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.75 7.75 7.75 7.75 7.75 8.75 3
Arizona 6.75 6.90 7.25 7.35 7.65 7.80 7.90 8.05 8
Arkansas 6.25 6.25 7.50 4
California 6.75 6.75 7.50 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 3
Colorado 6.85 7.02 7.28 7.28 7.36 7.64 7.78 8.00 8.23 8
Connecticut 7.10 7.40 7.65 7.65 8.00 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.70 9.15 6
Delaware 6.15 6.15 6.65 7.15 7.15 7.75 8.25 5
D.C. 6.60 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.55 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 9.50 10.5 7
Florida 6.15 6.40 6.67 6.79 7.21 7.31 7.67 7.79 7.93 8.05 11
Georgia 3
Hawaii 6.25 6.75 7.25 7.25 7.25 3
Idaho 3
Illinois 6.50 6.50 7.00 7.63 7.88 8.13 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 5
Indiana 3
Iowa 6.20 7.25 7.25 2
Kansas 3
Kentucky 3
Louisiana 3
Maine 6.35 6.50 6.75 7.00 7.25 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 5
Maryland 6.15 6.15 6.15 8.25 4
Massachusetts 6.75 6.75 7.50 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 3
Michigan 7.05 7.28 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 8.15 8.15 4
Minnesota 6.15 6.15 6.15 8.00 9.00 5
Mississippi 3
Missouri 6.50 6.65 7.05 7.35 7.50 7.65 7
Montana 6.15 6.25 6.90 7.35 7.65 7.80 7.90 8.05 10
Nebraska 8.00 4
Nevada 6.24 6.59 7.20 7.55 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25 5
New Hampshire 3
New Jersey 6.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.25 8.25 8.38 5
New Mexico 6.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 4
New York 6.00 6.75 7.15 7.15 7.15 8.00 8.75 6
North Carolina 6.15 6.15 3
North Dakota 3
Ohio 6.85 7.00 7.30 7.30 7.40 7.70 7.85 7.95 8.10 8
Oklahoma 3
Oregon 7.25 7.50 7.80 7.95 8.40 8.40 8.50 8.80 8.95 9.10 9.25 10
Pennsylvania 6.70 7.15 7.15 6
Rhode island 6.75 7.10 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.75 8.00 9.00 5
South Carolina 3
South Dakota 8.50 4
Tennessee 3
Texas 3
Utah 3
Vermont 7.00 7.25 7.53 7.68 8.06 8.06 8.15 8.46 8.60 8.73 9.15 10
Virginia 3
Washington 7.35 7.63 7.93 8.07 8.55 8.55 8.67 9.04 9.19 9.32 9.47 10
West Virginia  6.20 6.90 7.25 8.00 4
Wisconsin 5.70 6.50 6.50 6.50 4
Wyoming 3
Changes 12 17 47 45 47 5 9 8 10 18 24 242
Note: Two minimum wage changes happened in 2009 for Florida.
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Table 13: Summary Statistics of State-Level Effective Minimum Wage Changes (2005-2015)
Year Counts Mean S.D. Min Max
2005 12 0.621 0.475 0.10 1.45
2006 17 0.605 0.463 0.15 1.85
2007 47 0.831 0.527 0.25 1.90
2008 45 0.541 0.285 0.10 1.35
2009 47 0.533 0.206 0.05 1.00
2010 5 0.548 0.234 0.04 0.70
2011 9 0.160 0.190 0.06 0.70
2012 8 0.315 0.032 0.28 0.37
2013 10 0.160 0.068 0.10 0.35
2014 18 0.362 0.321 0.10 1.00
2015 24 0.629 0.467 0.12 1.85
Total 212 0.538 0.370 0.04 1.90
Note: All units are in nominal dollars.
C.2 The raw ACS 2005-2015 PUMA database cleanup
First, I merge the three raw ACS 2005-2007, 2008-2010 and 2011-2015 data files into one
that contains all the relevant variables between 2005-2015. The raw ACS files are down-
loaded directly from the US Census Bureau, following https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/acs/data/pums.html. From year 2012, the ACS starts to use the 2010 version of Pub-
lic Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). Therefore, I further use the 2000-2010 PUMA crosswalk
(https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/puma00 {}puma10 {}crosswalk {}pop.shtml) to map the
2010 PUMA definitions to 2000 PUMA definitions for all the years after 2010. The variables
obtained from the raw database are reported in Table 14. The wage measures are adjusted
for inflation to be “2015 dollars” equivalent. I further put an age restriction 16 ≤ age ≤ 30
on the population.
Next, I convert the individual-level observations into county-level moments, reported
in Table 15. The biggest challenge in this process is that the basic geographic units for
respondents in ACS is “Public Use Micro Areas”(PUMAs) rather than any jurisdiction
geographic entity (i.e. county, city, etc.) in order to comply with census non-identifiable
disclosure rule. Therefore, I instead construct the “pseudo” county-level statistics by the
following two steps: (1) First, I construct the PUMA-level summary statistics from the
corresponding individual-level variables. (2) Second, I impute the county-based measures
from the corresponding PUMA-based measures following the crosswalk provided by Michigan
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Table 14: Variables obtained from the raw ACS
Variables Variable labels
serialno Housing unit/GQ person serial number
puma Public use microdata area code
st State code
adjinc Adjustment factor for income and earnings dollar amounts
agep Age
pwgtp Person’s weight replicate
migpuma Migration PUMA
migsp Migration recode - state or foreign country code
powpuma Place of work PUMA
powsp Place of work - State or foreign country recode
schl Educational attainment
esr Employment status recode
wagp Wages or salary income past 12 months
wkhp Usual hours worked per week past 12 months
wkw Weeks worked during past 12 months
Table 15: Converting individual-level observations to county-level moments
Individual-level
variables
County-level variables Definition RAW
ACS
High type
dummy
High type fraction Education attainment is high school graduate or
above
schl
Low type
dummy
Low type fraction Education attainment is high school dropouts schl
Employment
dummy
Employment rate by
types (high and low)
(1) Employed at work and (2) employed with a job
but not at work
esr
Hourly wage Average hourly wage
by types (high and
low)
“Wages or salary income past 12 months”(wagp)
divided by the product of “usual hours worked per
week past 12 months”(wkhp) and “weeks worked
during past 12 months”(wkw)
wagp,
wkhp,
wkw
Migrants
dummy
The fraction of
migrants by types
(high and low)
Individuals who report a migration states (not
N/A)
migsp
Commuters
dummy
The fraction of
commuters by types
(high and low)
Individuals who report the place of work different
from the place of residence
powsp
Labor force
dummy
Labor force
participation rate by
type (high and low)
(1) Employed at work, (2) employed with a job but
not at work and (3) unemployed
esr
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Table 16: County-level moments obtained from QWI
Variables Definition Raw QWI
Average monthly
earnings
Average monthly earnings of employees who worked on
the first day of the reference quarter.
EarnBeg
Employment Estimate of the total number of jobs on the first day of
the reference quarter.
Emp
Hire rate The number of workers who started a new job at any
point of the specific quarter as a share of employment
HirA/Emp
Separation rate The number of workers whose job in the previous
quarter continued and ended in the given quarter
SepBeg/Emp
Population Studies Center http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/dis/census/Features/puma2cnty/.
The new constructed county-level variables are reported in second column in Table 15, while
the original individual-level variables are displayed in first column.
Finally, I label the adjacent counties on the state borderline, consistent with the clas-
sification showed in figure 1. Table 2 and the second panel in table 3 report conditional
statistics both by educational types and by interior/borderline locations.
C.3 The raw QWI 2005Q1-2015Q4 database cleanup
The time series of county-level variables from QWI are directly obtained through LED
extraction tool https://ledextract.ces.census.gov/static/data.html. The age group 19-21, 22-
24, 25-34 are selected. The variables displayed in table 16 are calculated and used in this
paper.
C.4 Creating the merged sample using multiple data sources
In this session, I will report the final step to merge multiple data sources together into
the final completed sample. First, I will use QWI as the baseline data sample. Second, I
will merge the ACS into QWI. Third, I will further merge other county-level moments from
several different data sources.
 Step 1: build the baseline data structure with QWI variables. I create a bal-
anced panel of all contiguous county-pairs with quarterly frequency between 2005Q1-
2015Q4. (Obs. 43,596) Then I only keep the observations when one of the two counties
changes its minimum wage at quarter t and the information for the following quarter
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Table 17: Key moments from other data sources
Variables Definition Data source Year Completeness
Bargaining
power αj
The annual payroll expenditure in account
for the employer value of sales, shipments,
receipts, revenue, or business done in
restaurant industry (NAICS:722)
Economy Wide Key
Statistics (EWKS)
2012 2,243
Matching
technology ωj
The number of divided by the number of
total ads and reflects the latest month for
which unemployment data is available
The Conference board
Help Wanted OnLine
(HWOL)
2017.4 2,306
The centroid
distance djj′
- Dube et al. (2010). - 2,314
The local
amenity γj
Median gross rent 2011-2015 American
Community Survey
2012 2,314
t + 1 is still completed. (Obs. 3,278) I only keep one quarter observation if minimum
wage changes multiple times in one year. (Obs. 2,886)
 Step 2: merge with the pseudo county-level ACS 05-15 variables. I merge
the ACS into QWI using the indicator combining county-pair and year. I use the QWI
data from step 1 as the master file for the merge. Then I only keep all the observation
with positive shares of both migrants and commuters. (Obs. 2,314)
 Step 3: merge additional other variables from several different databases. I
merge several key variables from other data sources which are displayed in the following
table. The final sample covers 2,243 observations with all variables completed.
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